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versity Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 159. $19.95.

LAW.

In May 1997, the New York Knickerbockers basketball team
was poised to reach the finals of its division in the National Basket
ball Association (NBA). The Knicks led the rival Miami Heat by
three games to two and needed one more victory to win the best-of
seven semifinal playoff series. Game six would be in New York;
with their star center, Patrick Ewing, playing well, victory seemed
assured for the Knicks. A fracas during game five changed the
odds. During a fight under the basket between Knicks and Heat
players, Ewing left the bench and paced in the middle of the court,
away from the fight. Rule 12A, Section IX(c), of the NBA Rules
provided: "During an altercation, all players not participating in
the game must remain in the immediate vicinity of their bench. Vi
olators will be suspended, without pay, for a minimum of one
game," commencing "prior to the start of their next game."1 Ap
plying the rule, NBA Commissioner David Stem suspended Ewing
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. M.A. 1974, Harvard; J.D. 1978, Yale.
- Ed. I received helpful comments from James Brudney, Peter Byrne, Neal Katya!, Mark
Tushnet, Adrian Vermeule, and other participants at a Georgetown University Law Center
faculty workshop. Matt Michael provided extremely useful research assistance and can be
blamed for my generalizations about Generation X law students, see infra note 16. Thanks
and apologies to Ayn Rand for the title.
My own complicated biases should be identified at the outset. Although I am something
of a skeptic, the new textualism is the best thing that has happened to me professionally. The
casebook for Legislation that Phil Frickey and I developed in the mid-1980s focused strongly
on statutory interpretation, a then-neglected field. Justice Scalia joined the Court the year
before our book was published, and the pizzazz he brought to statutory cases not only filled
up our supplements and the second edition with great cases, but stimulated much greater
academic as well as public interest in the field. I have published many articles on statutory
interpretation, the most cited of which is my friendly critique of Scalia's theory. See William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1991). I have loved teaching
statutory interpretation to students at Georgetown, NYU, Harvard, and Stanford. In the
1990s, Scalia has been a regular visitor to my Georgetown classes, which is exceedingly gen
erous of him and great fun for the students. Fmally, there is nothing so enjoyable as teaching
Scalia's vividly written, intellectually splendid, normatively outraged dissent in Johnson v.
Santa Clara County Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987), the Title VII affirmative
action case.
1. NBA Rule 12A, Section IX(c) reads in full:
During an altercation, all players not participating in the game must remain in the
immediate vicinity of the bench. Violators will be suspended, without pay, for a mini
mum of one game and fined up to $20,000.
The suspensions will commence prior to the start of their next game.
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and another player for game six in New York, which the Knicks
lost; two other players were suspended for game seven in Miami,
which the Knicks also lost. Having lost the series, four games to
three, the Knicks cried foul: the rule should not have been applied
to Ewing because he did not leave the bench to join the altercation.
The rule was not intended to apply to Ewing; it was not fair to apply
the rule to someone who was not contributing to the fight; "we wuz
robbed."
The foregoing argument, made not only by the Knicks but also
in print by philosopher Ronald Dworkin and proceduralist Linda
Silberman, both law professors at New York University,2 reflects
good old-fashioned common law reasoning from a rule to a new
and perhaps unanticipated fact situation.3 Justice Antonin Scalia's
Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, published with commen
taries and response by the author as A Matter of Interpretation, say
humbug to all that. Apply the rule according to its plain meaning.
Do not consider the "intent" of its drafters.4 Unfairness is irrele
vant when the rule applies as a matter of plain textual meaning.
Stem did the right thing and for the right reasons. Ewing must be
suspended. He and his colleagues will know better than to leave
the bench during the next melee.
The statutory analogue to the Case of the Wandering Basketball
Player is the Case of the Imported Pastor. In Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court, in 1892, interpreted a
statute criminally prohibiting anyone from contracting with an
"alien" to pay his transportation to the United States "to perform
labor or service of any kind. "6 Although the Church had paid the
way for The Reverend E. Walpole Warren to come to the United
States to serve as pastor of its congregation, the Supreme Court
A team must have a minimum of eight players dressed and ready to play in every
game.
If five or more players leave the bench, the players will serve their suspensions alpha
betically, according to the first letters of their last name[s].
If seven players are suspended (assuming no participants are included), four of them
would be suspended for the first game following the altercation. The remaining three
would be suspended for the second game following the altercation.
NBA OPERATIONS DEPT., OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL AssocIATION,
1996-1997, at 41 (1996).
2. See James Traub, Talk ofthe Town, NEw YORKER, June 2, 1997, at 35 (relating Dwor
kin's analysis); Linda Silberman, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1997 (Correspondence), at 18. For a
particularly detailed analysis, see Robert A. Hillman, What the Knicks Debacle of '97 Can
Teach Students About the Nature of Rules, 47 J. LEG. Eo. 393 (1997).
3. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEG AL PROCESS 68 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (describing the case of the spoiled heir).
4. Stem himself drafted the rule, which had been adopted in 1994. Scalia's point would
be that any NBA adjudicative tribunal should apply the rule without calling up Stem and
asking, "What did you mean by this rule? Did you have mid-court wanderlust in mind?"
5. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
6. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332.
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created an exception to the statutory prohibition, common law
style, for Christian ministers and; in dictum, for other "brain toil
ers." This is the only case discussed in the Tanner Lectures (pp. 1823). The Court, argues Scalia, interpreted the law contrary to its
plain meaning - a minister is performing "labor or service" of
some kind - in order to fit what the Court considered the statute's
purpose, or "spirit," as Justice David Brewer's evangelical opinion
put it (p. 19). Bad. The Court divined the statutory spirit from
committee reports accompanying the 1885 legislation; the reports
asserted that the proposed law was only aimed at manual workers
and not "brain toilers," and the report of the Senate committee la
mented that the limitation would have been more explicit had there
been time for amendment (pp. 19-20). Worse. The Court ended its
exercise with an ode to the United States as a "Christian Nation,"
whose statutes presumptively should not be construed to thwart the
exercise of religion (pp. 19-20). This is the worst, according to
Scalia. The Holy Trinity Church Court got the Case of the Im
ported Pastor as wrong as the law professors got the Case of the
Wandering Basketball Player wrong.
More generally, both the Tanner Lectures and Scalia's judicial
opinions defend a hard-hitting "new textualism"7 as the best, and
perhaps only, legitimate approach to statutory interpretation.
Scalia's main point is that a statutory text's apparent plain meaning
must be the alpha and the omega in a judge's interpretation of the
statute. The apparent plain meaning is that which an ordinary
speaker of the English language - twin sibling to the common
law's reasonable person - would draw from the statutory text.
This general principle is not original with Scalia; the British House
of Lords and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes followed the same idea
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8 Yet Scalia's
theory really is a new textualism.
T heoretically, Scalia defends his approach based upon a strict
formal separation of powers: the constitutional role of the legisla
ture is to enact statutes, not to have intent or purposes, and the role
of the courts is to apply the words and only the words, without re
gard to arguments of fairness or political equilibrium (pp. 9-13).
This constitutional basis for the plain meaning rule gives it greater
bite and may explain why Scalia tries to find or create a plain mean
ing for the tersest law. Scalia also invokes institutional reasons for
his approach, as one which judges are best trained to accomplish

7. "The new textualism" is my term for statutory Ninoprudence. See Eskridge, supra
note *. In response to Ronald Dworkin's co=ent on his lecture, Scalia characterizes his
approach as following the "import" of a statutory text. Seep. 144.
8. See Vacher & Sons v. London Socy. of Compositors, 1 App. Cas. 107, 121-22 (H.L.
1912); Hill v. East & West India Dock Co., 9 App. Cas. 448, 464-65 (H.L. 1884); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899).
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and which protects against judicial usurpation. Finally, there is an
economic dimension to Scalia's thinking: while the temptation to
do justice ex post in every case is humanly appealing, disciplined
judges should resist that temptation, because it ex ante sets up
wasteful, usurpative incentives for everybody else (pp. 36-37).
Scalia's wedding of formalist, institutionalist, and economic think
ing in the undertheorized area of statutory interpretation is norma
tively powerful.
Doctrinally, the new textualism's most distinctive feature is its
insistence that judges should almost never consult, and never rely
on, the legislative history of a statute (pp. 29-37). The rejection of
legislative history and insistence that judges follow plain meanings
even when unreasonable contribute to the overall theme of the
Tanner Lectures: common law approaches, emphasizing purpose,
policy, and history, are not appropriate for statutory interpretation
in the modem administrative state (pp. 9-14). Consistent with this
theme, Scalia has developed a rigorously text-based methodology
that contrasts strikingly with the common law approach in Holy
Trinity Church. Like Holmes, the new textualist starts with the
meaning an ordinary reader would draw from the statutory lan
guage but delves more deeply than Holmes usually did into what
other textual sources might teach us. Thus, the Scallan interpreter
also considers which interpretation is most consistent with the stat
ute as a whole; whether similar language has been used elsewhere
in the U.S. Code and, if so, how it has been interpreted; and regular
rules of grammar, syntax, and word use.9 When textual analysis is
done thoroughly, it can actually persuade a hostile audience, a feat
hard to accomplish under other approaches to statutory
interpretation.
Rhetorically, Scalia makes the stakes of statutory theory and
practice well worth thinking and fighting about. The Tanner Lec
tures ringingly combine an ambitious insistence that statutory inter
pretation is important for the future of democracy (p. 9) and the
rule of law (p. 25) with lively critique of the unsystematic way it is
taught in law schools (pp. 14-15), practiced by attorneys and judges
(pp. 18-22, 31), and theorized as either reconstructing the probable
9. This proposition is drawn from Scalia's opinions and not from the Tanner Lectures.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.380,'404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laun
dry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In one
respect, the Tanner Lectures are potentially misleading. Scalia warns that "[t]o the honest
textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of trouble," p. 28, and
criticizes the substantive canons, pp. 28-29. Yet Scalia himself not only cites but heavily relies
on these "substantive" canons. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,
33-34 (1992) (relying on a clear statement rule against waivers of federal sovereign immu
nity); see also 503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as bend
ing the statutory language in ways not supported by precedent or modem policy); supra Part
IV (providing more extensive analysis of this point).
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"intent" of the legislature (pp. 16-17) or resolving cases common
law style, so as to reach the most "desirable result" (pp. 12-13, 2122). Scalia suggests that statutory interpretation can again be an
objective "science" (p. 14) if properly done by honest textualists;
and that the science of statutory interpretation can assure both de
mocracy and the rule of law. "What intellectual fun all of this is!"

(p. 7).

On the one hand, the new textualism has relatively few defend
ers in academe (a haven for the contextually inclined),10 is treated
skeptically and often dismissively by Scalia's colleagues on the
Court,11 and is appalling to many members of Congress.12 On the
other hand, Scalia's theory dominates debate about statutory inter
pretation, is gathering more defenders in academe,13 has one other
fan on the Court (Justice Thomas) and influences the way all the
other justices write their opinions and advocates argue their cases
before the Supreme Court,14 is increasingly popular in the state
courts and among many federal judges,15 and has a strong allure for
10. Leading critiques include Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Inter
preting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members
and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates,
and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39 (1990); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and In
coherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995); William Popkin, An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 16 MINN. L. REv.
1133 (1992); Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399;
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 407 (1989);
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use ofLegislative History in Construing Statutes
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDozo
L. REv. 1597 (1991).
11. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991).
12. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
13. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence ofStrict
Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 401 (1994); Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline
ofLegislative History: Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PuB. INT.
L. REv. 57; John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 673
(1997); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation ofFederal Stat
utes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. Cr. REv. 231.
14. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351 (1994).
15. This is my opinion, drawn from my ten-year participation in the Institute for Judicial
Administration summer program for state and federal judges. The cross section of judges I
have met strikes me as much more textualist now than ten years ago. Better evidence for my
proposition in the text would be a time-series study of decisions in particular state courts or
federal circuits. This would be a great student Note project.
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Generation X law students.16 If most scholars and colleagues are
still skeptical that the new textualism "gets it right," Scalia can
boast a postmodern triumph: the new textualism has been agenda
setting and a public relations hit.
The new textualism is successful primarily because it is familiar
but simple, on its face neutral and normatively attractive, objective,
and relatively nonreflexive. Everyone believes that statutory text is
the starting point for construing statutes, but judges and scholars
have elaborated upon this familiar rule to create complexities that
dilute the rule. Scalia takes what is familiar and cuts away the detri
tus, such as qualifications to plain meaning when plain meaning is
contrary to legislative intent or purpose or constitutional policy.
What is left is simplicity itself: when construing statutes, consider
the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text. Period. This is
refreshingly easy to understand and would seem to be straightfor
ward to apply. Because textualism appears relatively easy to apply
and scientific, it strikes one as more objective and determinate.
You could tell 100 judges to apply textual plain meaning to a partic
ular statute, and they would all come back with about the same
answer - an impossible feat under original intent or more dynamic
approaches to statutes. This relative determinacy not only renders
statutory interpretation more neutral, but also subserves both the
rule of law (we citizens know what is expected of us) and democ
racy (the legislature can be certain that its statutes will be applied as
written, not as judges wish they had been written). If this is true,
then honest textualism is all that judges should be doing in statutory
interpretation cases.
This is a serious claim, advanced for the first time in a systematic
way by the jurist best situated to press it. The gravity of Scalia's
enterprise and the importance of the issues he poses require a cor
relative seriousness from academics. Although I have both appreci
ated and questioned Scalia's new textualism in previous articles, the
publication of the Tanner Lectures provides me with an opportunity
to evaluate the new textualism in a more systematic way. This re
view sets forth several problems that complicate Scalia's important
and compelling theses. The problems leave me skeptical that the
bene:f;its he claims for an honest textualism are attainable, but offer
16. I cannot speak for "all," or "any," Generation X law students, as I am a Baby
Boomer. Still, I have taught statutory interpretation to more than 1000 students at five dif
ferent law schools, and that qualifies me to make some generalizations. Many law students
take to the new textualism like rats to a maze. Even some law students who dislike most of
the results Scalia reaches find his methodology potentially attractive. Law students particu
larly enjoy Scalia's cynical attack on legislative history, pp. 31-34. But students also would
like to be able to have something more objective, at least as lawyers, and Scalia's uncynical
devotion to text gives them the most objective-sounding approach they are likely to get in
law school.
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Scalia and his allied textualists an opportunity to defend their ap
proach more rigorously.
Some of the problems are logical ones. Because Scalia's theory
and much of its appeal are formalist, the theory needs to satisfy
traditional formalist criteria of coherence and authority. How can
Scalia's refusal even to consider statutory legislative history square
with his strong reliance on legislative history in construing the Con
stitution (the problem of coherence)? By what formal constitu
tional authority does Scalia support his methodology, especially its
insistence that legislative history and concepts of equity and reason
ableness not be considered (the problem of authority)?
Other problems relate to the primary appeal of formalist
method, which is that it produces more determinate answers to
hard questions than squishy functionalist methods. Whether the
new textualism can deliver on its formalist promise can be tested
against the example Scalia runs in the Tanner Lectures, Holy Trinity
Church, and against his own impressive performance on the
Supreme Court. Are text-based or linguistic sources, such as dic
tionaries, less manipulable than legislative history (the problem of
context)? What role do the variegated canons of statutory con
struction play in a new textualist methodology (the problem of
loose canons)?
Yet other problems relate to the claimed neutrality and legiti
macy of textualist interpretation. The new textualism makes as
sumptions about the role of courts and justice in our constitutional
system that should be examined. Is Scalia's attack on legislative
history properly respectful to the legislature (the problem of de
mocracy)? Can normative considerations be excluded from statu
tory cases, even for an honest textualist such as Scalia (the problem
of normativity)?
This review shall pose more questions than answers. The con
crete cases examined, starting with the Case of the Wandering Bas
ketball Player and the Case of the Imported Pastor and
supplemented with the Case of the Foreclosure Fire Sale and the
Case of the Modifying Agency, will be used as templates against
which to test Scalia's theory and to frame my inquiries. At the end
of this review, I shall suggest the sort of approach one should take
with these cases. Although the Tanner Lectures generously tag me
as endorsing the Supreme Court's traditionally dynamic rather than
purely textualist approach to statutory interpretation (p. 22), the
book Scalia cites is one that is normatively critical of the Court's
dynamism in several lines of cases.17 My prescriptive recommenda
tions are more pragmatic and critical than dynamic, and in the Case
17. WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY lNTERPRETATION 81-105, 107-09,
139-40, 173, 199-204 (1994).
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of the Imported Pastor and the Case of the Foreclosure Fire Sale it
is Scalia who endorses dynamic readings of statutes where I would
(very reluctantly in the latter case) take a more originalist stance.
I. THE PROBLEM

OF COHERENCE

Scalia's Tanner Lectures are not just about statutory interpreta
tion; a brief concluding section criticizes theories of the "Living
Constitution" (pp. 41-47). The goal of constitutional interpretation,
Scalia says, is to determine "the original meaning of the text" (p.
45). Scalia's position on constitutional interpretation - which re
jects an evolving, au courant Constitution in favor of an originalist,
stagnant one - is subtly and perhaps just tentatively different from
his position on statutory interpretation.18 If the former seeks out
the original meaning of the text, the latter says, with Holmes, "I
don't care what [the legislature's] intention was. I only want to
know what the words mean" (pp. 22-23). The former suggests a
relatively more historicist inquiry, the latter a relatively more lin
guistic one. To illustrate this potential nuance, contrast Scalia's
constitutional analysis in his recent opinion for the Court in Printz
v. United States, 19 which struck down the Brady Act's requirement
that local law enforcement officers help administer the federal law's
background checks of gun buyers, with his statutory analysis of the
imported pastor issue in Holy Trinity Church.
In Printz, Scalia found "no constitutional text speaking to the
precise question" of whether the Constitution prohibits the federal
government from commandeering state or local law enforcement
officers to help administer a federal statutory scheme. Although
the normal rule in the absence of a "constitutional text speaking to
the precise question" is that Congress can regulate issues within its
constitutional jurisdiction (here, interstate commerce) as it chooses,
Scalia found a constitutional limitation in "the historical under
standing and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in
the jurisprudence of this Court."20 The dead Constitution that
Scalia describes in the Tanner Lectures came alive in Printz because
Scalia cobbled together a constitutional limit from several sources:
historical practice, including early congressional assertions of au
thority and the debates surrounding the Constitution's ratification;
the Constitution's overall commitment to the principle of federal
ism, which would be undermined by national commandeering of
state and local officials; and the Court's own decision in New York
18. Ronald Dworkin's comment on the Tanner Lectures says Scalia is a "semantic
originalist" in statutory cases, but an "expectations originalist" in constitutional ones. P. 119.
Scalia accepts the distinction more or less. Pp. 144-45.
19. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
20. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370.
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United States,21 which struck down national commandeering of
state legislatures and which Scalia .e�ended to commandeering of
local law enforcement officers.

v.

The contrast between Scalia's methodology in Printz and his
analysis of Holy Trinity Church is striking and can be generalized.
To begin with, text plays a different role in the two cases. It is the
primary and perhaps even exclusive focus in the statutory case, but
only a secondary and indirect focus in the constitutional case. This
is characteristic of Scalia's approach in other cases as well. In
Scalia's approach to issues of constitutional federalism22 or separa
tion of powers,23 there is usually little or no analysis of specific con
stitutional provisions but much emphasis on general principles
drawn from the overall structure of the document and its history.
This is not so far from the spirit analysis that Brewer deployed in
Holy Trinity Church, the case in which Scalia insists that the Court
should have stuck to the plain meaning of the provision in question.
In statutory cases, Scalia is dismissive of appeals to statutory pur
pose and requires parties to demonstrate a clear text on point
before he will deliver the goods. Tue different role of text for Scalia
in constitutional and statutory cases can be defended on the ground
that the Constitution is a short document mostly drafted two centu
ries ago, while statutes are more recent and usually much more de
tailed. Hence, in the latter cases there is more likely to be text on
point. But this defense is in tension with Scalia's belief that the
Constitution should not evolve to fulfill abstract principles, and
with his view that judicial discretion must be limited by confining
judges to the application of plain meanings, not spongy spirits.
Additionally, Scalia's inquiry in Printz and other constitutional
cases is strongly historical: What did this text signify to people of
the time? The Tanner Lectures' analysis of Holy Trinity Church,
which construed a statute enacted more than 100 years ago, is ahis
torical and shows no interest in what the statutory command, not to
import aliens for "labor or service of any kind," would have meant
to the people of the time against the backdrop of early national
21. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
22. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-78; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in p� and dis
senting in part). Although Scalia did not author the Seminole majority opinion or the U.S.
Term Limits dissent, he joined both opinions and they reflect his approach. On the other
hand, it is noteworthy that Scalia did not join that part of the Court's opinion in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164-66 (1997), that discussed the drafting history of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See 117 S. Ct. at 2159.
23. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Lujan v. Defenders of Wtld
life, 504 U.S. 505 (1992); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent
ing); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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immigration policy. In fact, there is reason to think that some ordi
nary speakers of the English language would have limited the statu
tory language to manual workers and would not have extended it to
brain toilers such as the Holy Trinity Church pastor. The first defi
nition of the term "labor"listed in the 1879 and 1886 editions of
Webster's Dictionary was "Physical toil or bodily exertion . . . hard
muscular effort directed to some useful end, as agriculture, manu
factures, and the like . . . "24 The first, and preferred, definition
supports Brewer's intuition that brain toilers were not targeted by
the statute (although Brewer cheerfully conceded that statutory
plain meaning cut against his view!). The second listed definition,
"intellectual exertion, mental effort,"25 was broad enough to in
clude brain as well as manual toilers, but judges of the period were
more likely to follow the primary definition. In the 1880s, judges
interpreting the laws and treaties excluding Chinese "laborers"or
persons brought over for "labor"held that the terms should be read
in their primary popular senses, to mean "physical labor for another
for wages," and therefore not to include actors, teachers, or
merchants. 26
The contemporary definition of "service" was also narrow.
Webster's first, and only relevant, definition of the term was: "The
act of serving; the occupation of a servant; the performance of labor
for the benefit of another, or at another's command; attendance of
an inferior, or hired helper, or slave, &c., on a superior, employer,
master, or the like . . .."72 Legal dictionaries of the period defined
"service"more broadly, as "being employed to serve another; duty
or labor to be rendered by one person to another."82 When lawyers
spoke of professional work, they appear to have used the term
"services"rather than "service."92
If contemporaries saw "labor or service of any kind"to be phys
ical and helper work, as these sources suggest, Scalia has less cause
.

24. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 745
(Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter, eds., rev. ed. 1879). The 1886 edition had precisely
the same definitions for all the words discussed in this review.
25. Id. The now-authoritative Black's Law Dictionary, published shortly after the statute
was executed, focused on the first meaning. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY
OF LAW 682 (1891) (defining labor to mean "[w]ork; toil; service. Continued exertion, of the
more onerous and inferior kind, usually and chiefly consisting in the protracted expenditure
of muscular force").
26. See In re Ho King, 14 F. 724 (D. Or. 1883); State v. Rush, 55 Wis. 465 {1882); see also
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 8-11, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
{1892) (No. 143) {discussing cases construing "laborer" or "labor").
27. WEBSTER, supra note 24, at 1206. The other definitions, including "spiritual obedi·
ence and love," were not relevant to employment.
28. BLACK, supra note 25, at 1083; see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1868).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 390 {1886) (referring to "services"
rendered by public officials); Boyd v. Gorman, 157 N.Y. 365, 365 {1898) (referring to lawyer's
"services").
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to reject the result in Holy Trinity Church.30 What is significant is
that Scalia was not interested enough in contemporary understand
ing to "look it up."31 While he has shown such interest in some
statutory cases,32 Scalia often devotes little or no effort to figuring
out how contemporaries actually would have understood the terms
used in statutes.
The biggest discontinuity between Scalia's constitutional and
statutory analysis is the role of legislative history. The most doctri
nally distinctive feature of his statutory jurisprudence is its sweep
ing rejection of legislative history. Scalia considers the legislative
discussion prior to a statute's enactment not only subordinate to the
statutory text, but not even worthy of consideration. If Scalia were
persuaded that "labor or service of any kind" semantically meant
only manual or helper work, he would concur in the judgment
reached by Brewer in Holy Trinity Church. But he would write sep
arately, insisting that the legislative history have no role in deciding
or even discussing the issue of the imported pastor. In §tatutory
cases, Scalia will often concur only in the judgment because he re
jects the majority opinion's use of legislative history.33 In the 1996
Term, he went so far as to refuse to join a footnote of an opinion
that merely explained why "[w]e give no weight to the legislative
history."34
Contrast this stance with Scalia's constitutional opinions, which
generally, and sometimes extensively, discuss the debating history
of the Constitution. In Printz, for example, Scalia's opinion care
fully considered and vigorously disputed the dissenters' deployment
of The Federalist to support their view that the Brady Act provision
in question was constitutional because the framers and everybody
else assumed that the federal government did have the power to
30. Scalia can still object that "labor or service of any kind" should be broader than
simple "labor," including the brain toilers who also, literally, do work, as well as the sweat
toilers who were the usual objects of the term. The Tanner Lectures, however, denounce
"literalism" almost as much as they denounce evolutive constructions. Pp. 23-24.
31. The Church made this kind of definitional argument in its brief. The United States
did not challenge the definitions. Compare Brief for Plaintiff in Error, 11-13, Holy Trinity,
143 U.S. 4S7 (discussing the dictionary and judicial definitions of labor and service) with
Brief for Defendant in Error, Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 4S7 (providing no response).
32. E.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 116 S. Ct. 1730, 173S-36 (1996).
33. See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 64S (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, SlO
U.S. 200, 219 {1994) {Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); Comoy v. Aniskoff,
S07 U.S. Sll, S18 {1993) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Thompson/
Center Arms Co., S04 U.S. SOS, S19 {1992) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Sullivan v.
Fmkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. S04, S27 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 4S2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
34. See Associates Co=ercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 n.* {1997) (noting
that Scalia joins the entire opinion except footnote 4).
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deploy state officials to carry out federal statutory schemes.35
Scalia's opinion also' affirmatively relied on The Federalist to estab
lish that the Constitution was meant to prohibit such deployment,
both as specifically understood by at least one framer, Madison,36
and as generally understood from the constitutional principle spirit? - of dual sovereignty.37 Printz is a high-water point for
Scalia's use of The Federalist because specific constitutional texts the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the
Supremacy Clause - on the whole support the dissenters and have
to be explained away. Nonetheless, Scalia in other opinions has re
lied on The Federalist to support his constitutional constructions.38
The Federalist was a series of propaganda documents penned by
supporters of the Constitution to persuade New York to ratify it.39
They are distinguishable from legislative history, of the sort in
voked in Holy Trinity Church, insofar as they were written by
smarter and more far-sighted people, but they are on the whole less
reliable sources for figuring out "the objective indication of the
words, rather than the intent of the [framers]" (p. 29). All of
Scalia's criticisms of legislative history apply to The Federalist: the
essays are not the "words" of the law, they take positions on issues
that the drafters of the Constitution did not think about, and they
were read by neither the drafters nor the delegates ratifying the
Constitution outside New York (pp. 29-33). To Scalia's criticisms
should be added another: because they were written 200 years ago,
and because the Constitution and the nation have decisively
evolved in ways the authors did not anticipate, The Federalist essays
operate upon assumptions that long ago died.
How can a jurist who detests statutory legislative history rely on
constitutional legislative history that is, if anything, less reliable?
The only defense I have ever heard from Scalia is that he does not
consider The Federalist "authoritative" in the same way the Court
has traditionally considered legislative history. This strikes me as
little more than a word game. Scalia and other constitutional
originalists use The Federalist as evidence of how a few of the fram
ers explained the purposes and some of the specific understandings
of the Constitution and particular provisions. For the most part,
judges have used statutory legislative history in the same way or as
35. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2373-74 (1997).
36. Hamilton may have had a similar understanding, but Scalia dismisses him as an out
lier on this issue. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374-75, 2375 n.9.
37. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-79 (invoking The Federalist ten times and quoting the
documents four times in determining the "essential postulate[s]" of the Constitution).
38. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) {Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. On the essays as propaganda and the problems with generalizing from them to repre
sent objective meaning or subjective intent, see ARTHUR FuRTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY
OF PuBLIUS: A READING OF THE FEDERALIST pAPERS {1984).
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confirmatory evidence of what the text apparently means; and most
of this century's major theories of statutory interpretation have ap
proached legislative history as evidence, not as authority.40
Although many users of legislative history call it "authoritative" ev
idence, The Federalist is authoritative in the same sense: if those
essays had been private letters by Thomas Jefferson (a brilliant man
and learned theorist, but not a framer of the Constitution), they
would not have the same cachet as public defenses by James
Madison (the note-taker at the Philadelphia Convention) and
Alexander Hamilton (a once and future leading Federalist). No
Justice or leading theoretician has, to my knowledge, confused stat
utory history (at best, authoritative evidence of legal meaning) with
statutory text (legal authority). Scalia's Supreme Court colleague,
Stephen Breyer, has thoughtfully justified legislative history consid
eration along these lines.41
Thus, it would appear that a jurist can and should consult both

The Federalist and statutory legislative history, for what they are
worth, in figuring out constitutional or statutory meaning. There is
insufficient reason to consider only one and not the other, unless
one can defend materially different approaches as to constitutional
interpretation and statutory interpretation. Such an argument is
possible,42 but it would present different kinds of trouble. Scalia
charges that the use of statutory legislative history augments judicial
discretion to read statutes willfully rather than lawfully (p. 36). If
that were so, the use of constitutional debating history is more dan
gerous, especially when the Court uses it, as in Printz, to create a
constitutional limitation not apparent from the plain language of
the Constitution (and arguably at odds with the Supremacy Clause).
Congress can, and often does, override willful judicial constructions
of statutes, but it usually cannot override willful judicial construc
tions of the Constitution. If judicial activism (substituting judicial
results for legislative ones) is presumptively suspect, as the Tanner
Lectures assume, then it is the constitutional and not the statutory
interpreter who should be especially chary of relying on debating
history. "Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick [in using legisla
tive history] is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out
your friends" (p. 36). That is precisely the charge made by the
Printz dissenters against Scalia's deployment of The Federalist and
other background evidence to create a constitutional limit on the
40. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, ch. 7; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Val
ues, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 365 (1992).
41. See Breyer, supra note 10.
42. I suggest some arguments along these and other lines in Textualism and Original In
tent: Should the Supreme Court Consult the Federalist Papers but not Statutory Legislative
History?,
GEo. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
_
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national government where none appears on the face of the
Constitution.43
Indeed, the debating history would seem more relevant for re
cently enacted statutes, where the legislative expectations relate to
a world we know and sometimes address issues still alive, than for
the grand old Constitution, where the expectations relate to a world
we know only through a glass darkly and address issues typically
dead or altered by circumstances. This point has a substantive di
mension. Debating history or general background surrounding the
Constitution adds context that is substantively slanted, not just to
ward the values of federalism in ways that the Reconstruction
Amendments sought to offset, but also systematically against the
interests of people of color (constitutional slaves in 1789), women
(legal servants), poor people (nonvoters), and religious and social
nonconformists (social outcasts), in ways that subsequent amend
ments and judicial constructions have sought to ameliorate. The
context of constitutional debating history is slanted in a conserva
tive direction much more so than the debating history of federal
statutes, most of which were enacted by Democratic Congresses
and therefore slanted too, but in a more regulatory-state direction.
In short, a generously purpose-oriented historicist interpretation of
the Constitution and an ungenerous approach to statutes are most
obviously (but perhaps superficially) reconciled as a politically con
servative move by courts. If this were the best explanation, it would
be a disturbing feature of the new textualism's incoherent treat
ment of constitutional and statutory debating history. If much of
the appeal of the new textualism is its neutrality and its aspiration
to eliminate all judicial activism, then any substantive slant is
worrisome.
II. THE PROBLEM

OF AUTHORITY

Scalia is an out-of-the-closet formalist (p. 25). He therefore
must have a theory by which the Constitution - the ultimate
source of formal authority for a federal judge - authorizes or, even
better, requires the new textualism as a methodology. Does the
Constitution require, encourage, or permit the new textualist ap
proach to statutory interpretation? There is nothing in the text of
the Constitution that requires judges to interpret statutes according
to their plain meanings. The "judicial Power"that Article III grants
to the Supreme Court and to inferior federal courts poses rather
43. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2401-04
(Souter, J., dissenting). Even some conservative scholars who take original intent seriously
and who firmly believe in federalism have found insufficient historical support to extend New
York's rule against co=andeering state legislatures, see supra note 21 and accompanying
text, to Printz 's rule against co=andeering state law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Sai
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993).
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than answers the question: What does "judicial Power" mean? In
statutory cases, would such power include only textual readings, or
would it include something more?
To answer these questions about the meaning of "judicial
Power," an interpreter following Scalia's approach to constitutional
interpretation, as articulated in Printz and other decisions, would
consider eighteenth-century practice, constitutional principle and
structure, and the ratifying debates. These sources provide more
support for a common law, equitable approach to statutory inter
pretation than for a strict, Scalian textualism. The following discus
sion is preliminary rather than definitive and invites further
scholarly inquiry. My tentative conclusions are the following: (1)
the goal of statutory interpretation was understood to implement
the "intent" of the legislature; (2) intent was derived from the statu
tory text, the spirit or purpose of the statute, precedent, the com
mon law and canons of statutory construction, and ideas of equity
and reasonableness; (3) statutory text, including the whole statute,
was on the whole the most important evidence of intent, but the
common law and equity exercised strong influence on how courts
read text; (4) it was sometimes acceptable for courts to depart from
the letter of a statute, in deference to its spirit, practice, or princi
ples; (5) legislative history, generally not available in published
form, was not discussed one way or the other; and (6) the framers
would have been receptive to Brewer's mode of analysis in Holy
Trinity Church, with a possible exception for a reading of his opin
ion that emphasized specific, subjective intent rather than general,
objective intent.
A.

Constitutional Background: Eighteenth-Century Statutory
Theory and Practice

In determining what import the Framers would have given to
"judicial Power" in statutory cases, one might start with then
contemporary practice, as Scalia did in Printz. The leading legal
treatise discussing statutory interpretation was Blackstone's Com
mentaries, considered almost as authoritative in the colonies and
new states as it was in the United Kingdom.44 Blackstone certainly
believed that statutory text was important - as the best but not the
only evidence of legislative intent.45 Following traditional English
practice, Blackstone said that "the most universal and effectual way
of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubi
ous, is by considering the reason and spirit of it . . . for when this
44. See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. RE.v. 799, 803 {1985).
45. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *59-*62, *91. See also Blatt, supra
note 44, at 802-05.
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reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it."46 This
"mischief rule" paid due regard to statutory plain meaning but em
phasized statutory purpose, or "spirit." Blackstone also recognized
that, as time passed, statutes would be applied to new circumstances
not contemplated by the legislature.
For, since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is neces
sary that when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to
particular cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of defin
ing those circumstances which (had they been foreseen) the legislator
himself would have expressed.47

Note the focus on legislative intent. In such cases, he urged judges
"to expound the statute by equity" and to reject unreasonable con
sequences "where some collateral matter arises out of the general
words" of the statute.48 Blackstone's willingness to leave room for
spirit-based, equitable constructions is closer to Brewer's rather
than Scalia's approach in Holy Trinity Church, and his collateral
matter rule seems tailored to Holy Trinity Church.
Blackstone was not the only background context for the fram
ers. In his comment on the Tanner Lectures, historian Gordon
Wood says that the American states were reconceptualizing the ju
diciary between 1776 and 1789 (pp. 49-63). The statutory decisions
of state courts are relevant to figuring out what "judicial Power"
meant to an American audience in 1789. I read most, if not all, of
the published state court statutory interpretation decisions of the
1780s and 1790s from Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. In light of Wood's statement,
I was surprised at how consistent practice in those states was with
Blackstonian precepts. Consider Executors of Barree/if! v. Admin
istrator of Griscom.49 Plaintiff obtained a judgment for £74 10s; af
ter failure of complete payment, plaintiff won a second judgment
for the £45 6s 2d balance. The issue was whether plaintiff was enti
tled to costs on the second action. A 1782 statute gave costs in "any
suit for any debt or demand" when the judgment was £50 or more,
but an 1847-48 statute provided for costs in "any suit, or action
whatsoever" where the sum sought was more than £15. The New
Jersey Supreme Court in 1793 framed the inquiry as "guided by the
designs and intentions of the legislature, so far as they are to be
46. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *61; see also Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638
(Ex. 1584) (urging judges "to make such construction [of the act] as shall suppress the mis
chief and advance the remedy"). Heydon's Case was a leading English authority whose mis
chief rule is discussed approvingly in 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *87.
47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *62.
48. Id. at *91. See also College of Physician's (Dr. Bonham's) Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 928
(C.P. 1609). Bonham's Case was an authority well known to eighteenth-century American
jurists. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 liARv. L. REv.
30 (1926).
49. 1

N.J.L.

193 (1793).
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gathered from the expressions they have employed."50 Thus, like
Blackstone, the court saw statutory text as part of an intentionalist
enterprise. More strikingly, the court avoided the plain meaning of
the 1782 statute - which would seem to deny plaintiff costs in the
second action - by Blackstonian precepts which created an excep
tion for "superior" actions to enforce judgments: (1) the equitable
policy of the earlier statute and its applicability to narrow the sec
ond; (2) the principle that a generally phrased statute can be nar
rowed when applied to unanticipated fact situations; and (3) the
"inconveniences" that would arise from not giving plaintiff its costs
in the second action.51 The court's ultimate articulation of its hold
ing was hardly textualist: "as we are not compelled by the letter
and perhaps spirit of the acts to adopt such [an inconvenient] con
struction, we are of opinion that they do not apply to this case and
that the plaintiff recover his full costs."52
Although several of the decisions from this period did seem to
follow a simple plain meaning approach to statutory interpreta
tion,53 the typical statement of the interpretive task was this:
We do not consider ourselves bound by the strictly grammatical con
struction of the words of the act. The intention of the legislature
should be our guide, or, rather, in a case of this nature, we should not
hesitate to adopt a construction which the words will clearly warrant,
free from those inconveniences which must flow from any other
interpretation.54

Although the statutory interpreter at the time of the framing cer
tainly paid close attention to statutory text, he read the text in light
of the Blackstonian ideas that statutes should be narrowly con
strued when they run up against common law presumptions,55
should be construed by reference to their spirits or purposes,56 and
50. 1 NJ.L. at 194.
51.

See 1

NJ.L. at 195.

52. 1 NJ.L. at 196.
53. See Jones v. Stokes, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 25 (1796) (adopting a literalist interpretation; in
clusio unius); Gregory v. Bray, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 29 (1796).
54. Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 NJ.L. 213, 214 (1794); see also Elliott v. Richards, 1 Del.
Cas. 87 (C.P. 1796).
55. See Smith v. Minor, 1 NJ.L. 16 (1790) (adopting, in dictum; the rule of lenity); WIStar
v. Kammerer, 2 Yeates 100 (Pa. 1796) (advocating a narrow construction of a statute so as not
to affect property rights); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 317 (1795)
(same); Paine v. Ely, D. Chip. 37, 39-40 (Vt. 1789) (observing that statutes creating unusual
jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed); Chichester v. Vass, 5 Va. (1 Call) 82, 92-102 (1797).
Compare White v. Hunt, 6 NJ.L. 415, 417-18 (1798) (Kinsey, C.J.) (advocating a rule against
retrospective application) with 6 NJ.L. at 419 (Kirkpatrick, J.) (interpreting words "consis
tent with reason and equity").
56. See Warder v. Arell, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 282, 299 (Va. 1796) (Carrington, J.) (rejecting
"strict rules of grammatical construction" in favor of "the spirit, as well as the just exposition
of the words of the law"); Grant's Lessee v. Eddy, 2 Yeates 147 (Pa. 1796) (adopting a purpo
sive approach); Hancock v. Hovey, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 104 (1799) (advocating an exception to
statutory plain meaning where suggested by "mischief' or "spirit" inquiries and advocating
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can sometimes be interpreted contrary to their apparent plain
meaning, when that is in tension with great principles.57
For an example of the last point, consider Bracken v. Visitors of
William and Mary College. 58 The Virginia Court of Appeals in that
case allowed the governing board of William and Mary to eliminate
the chair of grammar, which had been specifically mandated in the
decree creating the college. The Court acceded to the position
urged by William and Mary's counsel, John Marshall, who argued
that the primary intent of the authorizing statutes was to delegate
policymaking discretion to the Visitors and that changed circum
stances justified the Visitors' adoption of a plan contrary to some of
the details of the original statutory grant. "It was proper that this
discretion should be given to the Visitors, because a particular
branch of science, which at one period of time would be deemed all
important, might at another, be thought not worth acquiring," ar
gued Marshall. "In institutions, therefore, which are to be durable,
only great leading and general principles ought to be immutable. "59
B.

Constitutional Implication from Bicameralism
and Presentment

Although he does not consider judicial practice and contempo
rary understanding of what "judicial Power" meant in statutory
cases, Scalia does defend his approach as required by constitutional
principle. Specifically, he argues that the new textualism is sup
ported by Article I, Section 7's requirement that a bill does not be
come a statute unless it has been accepted in the same textual form
by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President (pp. 3435). Because only the statutory text actually becomes law, any un
written intentions of one house or of one committee or of one
member in Congress are not law unless it can be shown that they
were understood and accepted by both houses and by the President.
According to Scalia, relying on committee reports to determine a
statute's meaning is analogous to lawmaking by congressional subimplicit judicial notice of legislative deliberation); Watson & Hartshorne v. Alexander, 1 Va.
(1 Wash.) 340 (1794) (asserting that courts should reconcile textual plain meaning and eq
uity); Wallace v. Taliaferro, 6 Va. (2 Call) 445, 456-90 (1800) (similar).
57. See Anderson's Admrs. v. Anderson, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 3 (1789) (rejecting plain meaning
to achieve an equitable result); Hall v. Feild, 1 Del. Cas. 54 (1795) (asserting that the practice
under the statute at issue required departure from plain meaning); Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1
NJ.L. at 213 (asserting fairness reasons for applying a 1740 statute retroactively).
58. 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790).
59. Bracken, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 581. For an argument that Marshall was more textualist as
Chief Justice, see John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and
Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607 (1992). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (3
Cranch) 137 (1803) (applying an untextualist approach to construing the Judiciary Act of
1789); Hamilton v. Russell, 5 U.S. (3 Cranch) 309, 318 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (applying statu
tory construction to promote the "intent of the statute").

1527

Textualism

May 1998]

groups,60 which the Court found unconstitutional in INS
the legislative veto case.61

v.

Chadha,

Scalia is right that the Court should not consider legislative
background materials to have the authority of law; indeed, no jus
tice or serious scholar advances that proposition. In pressing the
argument to deny the relevance of legislative materials to the inter
pretation of statutes, Scalia reads too much into the bicameralism
and presentment requirements, however. Chadha, itself quoting a
Senate committee report, held that the bicameralism and present
ment requirements are only formally applicable when "actions
taken by either House . . . 'contain matter which is properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect"' - namely, to
alter legal rights and duties. 62 That is precisely the effect of the
legislative veto invalidated in Chadha. In contrast, committee re
ports consulted to explain the meaning of the statute do not them
selves alter legal rights and duties. Judicial consideration of
committee reports does not violate bicameralism or presentment
any more than would a judge's consulting a dictionary. Chadha
made this point and emphasized that bicameralism and present
ment are only limitations on Congress' actions - the requirements
are in Article I - and not the actions of branches of government
regulated by Articles II and III. Bicameralism is formally irrelevant
as a limitation on subsequent implementation and interpretation of
legislation.63
Even principle (or spirit) derived from Article I, Section 7 is
unlikely to support the new textualism. The purpose of the bicam
eralism requirement, according to Chadha, is "[t]he division of the
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative
power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and
60. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered during fall 1985 and spring
1986 at various law schools; transcript distributed by the Virginia Law Review).
61. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
62.

See Chadha,

462 U.S. at 952 (quoting S. REP. No. 54-1335, at 8 (1897)).

63. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.116. This footnote addresses administrative "lawmaking" and observes that
[e]xecutive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble 'legisla
tive' action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress
and the President for the reason that the Constitution, . . . [namely, Article II, which
describes the President's powers] does not so require. That kind of Executive action is
always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that
authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to
modify or revoke the authority entirely. A one-House veto is clearly legislative in both
character and effect and is not so checked; the need for the check provided by Art. I,
§§ 1, 7, is therefore clear.
This same analysis could be applied to judicial interpretation of statutes.
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debate in separate settings."64 The Constitution's contemplation of
deliberative discussion in the legislature suggests an implicit toler
ance for reviewing those deliberations on the part of those charged
with interpreting and implementing the legislation. Indeed,
Madison said as much in Federalist 47: "The judges can exercise no
executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive
stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with
by the legislative councils, " by which Madison meant subgroups or
committees of Congress.65 To the extent that committee reports
and other legislative history shed light on the "study and debate" in
which Congress is supposed to engage, the constitutional proce
dures of legislation would seem to support some consultation of leg
islative history.
It can be argued that any formal delegation by Congress of law
explication authority to congressional committees would be in dero
gation of Article I, Section 7, as interpreted in Chadha and Bowsher
v. Synar. 66 That kind of argument would, at most, caution against
judicial treatment of "subsequent legislative history" as authorita
tive in any way but, again, does not speak directly to judicial prac
tice or even to committees' generating reports that they hope will
influence judicial construction of statutes.
C.

Constitutional Principle and Debating History: Separation
of Powers

Scalia draws from the Constitution's separation of powers in Ar
ticles I-III the precepts that Congress should do all of the lawmak
ing and the Court as little as possible - unless explicitly and
broadly delegated by Congress, as in the Sherman Act. According
to the new textualists, consideration of legislative history creates
greater opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion, thereby
enhancing the risk that the Court will exercise its own "WILL in
stead of JUDGMENT," effectively "substitut[ing] [its own] plea
sure to that of the legislative body."67 A focus on the text alone, in
contrast, is a more concrete inquiry that will better constrain the
tendency of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress.
64. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (emphasis
added).
66. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abate
ment of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991). The argument in the text is made at some
length in Manning, supra note 13. Manning does not follow Scalia in arguing for exclusion of
legislative history; he mainly argues that it should not be considered authoritative.
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 230 (Hamilton); see also Public Citizen v.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 78).
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The premise of Scalia's position - that separation of powers
denies the Court any law-affecting function - is at odds with the
way at least some framers understood the import of the Constitu
tion. By separating the power to enact statutes (Article I) from the
power to enforce (Article II) or interpret (Article III) statutes, the
Constitution contemplates not just a separation of powers, but also
a cooperation of different power centers. That is, the constitutional
scheme sets up a structure where ongoing policy creation will be
interactive and dynamic rather than unitary and static. The framers
created separate branches within the federal government, in part to
ensure that no one branch would create law and control policy by
itself. Madison argued in Federalist 47 that tyranny is more likely if
state power is concentrated in one department.68 In Federalist 51,
he maintained that segregating different lawmaking functions enactment, enforcement, interpretation - protects liberty because
ambition is made to counter ambition.69 For this reason, branches
that are separate can still have some "partial agency in" or "control
over" one another, and Madison saw the nature of those powers as
mutually encroaching, setting up a friendly competition among am
bitious officials seeking to protect the public good as the best way
to preserve their own authority.70 If one body (Congress) enacts
the laws, another institution (the Presidency) implements them, and
yet another (the Court) interprets them, then it is less likely that
tyrannical or unfair policies will result. This philosophy does not
insist that courts do nothing but apply textual plain meanings.
The framers of the Constitution were at least as pragmatic as
Blackstone in their approach to statutes, and it appears that one
specific reason for separating the enactment of statutes from their
interpretation is the framers' belief in the productivity of common
law, equitable interpretation like that defended by Blackstone.
This was the point of John Marshall's argument in Bracken, that the
governing board have freedom to create new rules "according to
their various occasion and circumstances, as to them should seem
most fit and expedient," limited only by "the great outlines marked
in the charter."71 The Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitu
tion were critical of Article Ill's assurance of judicial independence
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 65, at 139-42 (Madison) (quoting and relying
on Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit ofthe Laws, book XI, ch. VI (1748)).
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 65 (Madison).
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 65, at 140 (Madison); see also THE FEDERAL
IST No. 73 (Hamilton) (offering a similar rationale supporting the presidential veto); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton) (offering a similar rationale supporting judicial nullification
or melioration of "partial and unjust" statutes); see generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLIT
ICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 130-31 (1984).
71. See Bracken v. VISitors of Willi am and Mary College, 7 Va. (3 Call) 573, 580 (1790)
(reporting Marshall's argument).
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for precisely this reason: following Blackstone, federal courts
would apply the spirit and not the letter of the Constitution in ways
that neither the states nor even Congress could correct.72 The Anti
Federalist objection was usually to judicial review, but The Federal
Farmer in particular argued that unelected judges posed a threat to
liberty and state authority through their interpretation of statutes as
well.73
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist 78 responded to these attacks;
like his opponents, Hamilton focused on judicial review but treated
statutory interpretation as well. He followed Blackstone in believ
ing that courts should not only interpret statutes equitably, but
might also respond to "unjust and partial laws" by "mitigating the
severity and confining the operation of such laws."74 Hamilton's
reasoning was that interpretive curtailment of unjust laws would
force the legislature to "qualify" the severity of statutes it enacted,
knowing them to be subject to further review. " [N]o man can be
sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice
by which he may be a gainer today," and "every man must now feel
that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations
of public and private confidence. "75
Federalist 78 recognized the danger of "the substitution of
uudges'] pleasure to that of the legislative body." Like the Anti
Federalists, Hamilton saw his as mainly a problem for judicial re
view and not for statutory interpretation.76 Responding to the
Anti-Federalist fears of unconstrained judges, Hamilton argued
that courts were constrained in their interpretation of statutes. His
argument was not that statutory interpreters are constrained by the
plain meaning of statutory texts - which Hamilton never men
tioned - but instead by "strict rules and precedents";77 by the pur
pose of an independent judiciary "to secure a steady, upright, and
72. See Brutus XI, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERAL
ISTS: THE DEBATE OVER TiiE RATIFICATION oF THE CoNsTITUTioN 121, 123-24 (John P.
Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989); Brutus XV N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
73. See Federal Fanner XV N.Y.J., Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANT1FEDERALIST, supra note 72, at 315-16.
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 231 (Hamilton); see also DAVID F.
EPSTEIN, PoLmCAL THEORY OF TiiE FEDERALIST 188-90 (arguing that Hamilton was sug
gesting that "courts may be lenient against the lawmakers' intention" and that the framers
generally endorsed an equity-based approach to statutory interpretation).
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 232; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 73
(Hamilton) (offering a sinillar argument in favor of the presidential veto).
76. Federalist 18 mostly deals with judicial review in enforcing the limitations on govern
ment imposed by the Constitution, see THE FEDERALIST No 78, supra note 65, at 228-33
(Hamilton), and it is in that discussion that the language quoted in the previous sentence of
the text is found. See id. at 230. Hamilton's subsequent discussion of statutory interpretation
is brief, see id. at 231-32, before he concludes generally, see id. at 232-33.
77. Id. at 233.
,

,

.
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impartial administration of the laws";78 and by the institutional
weakness of the judiciary, whose judgments can be overridden by
the two more powerful branches.79 Hamilton's criteria for con
straining judges are more pragmatic criteria than the plain meaning
criterion of the new textualism.
Even if one accepts Scalia's premise that courts are supposed to
play a neutral, nondiscretionary, and perhaps even mechanical, role
in statutory policy implementation - a premise at some odds with
the framers' expectations - it is not clear that his new textualism
advances that goal. To begin with, it is mildly counterintuitive that
an approach asking a court to consider materials generated by the
legislative process, in addition to statutory text (also generated by
the legislative process), canons of construction (generated by the
judicial process), and statutory precedents (also generated by the
judicial process), leaves the court with more discretion than an ap
proach that considers just the latter three sources. Scalia responds
to this intuition: Because "legislative history is extensive" for most
statutes, "there is something for everybody," and that allows the
willful judge additional cherry-picking options to justify her pre
ordained position (p. 36). Scalia is in a better position to evaluate
judicial behavior than I am, but Scalia's position is surely both too
cynical and not cynical enough. It is too cynical to believe most
judges are that result-oriented. Generally speaking, the average
judge does not consider legislative history as authoritative and
looks at history to answer questions posed by the text, as applied to
the facts. The history informs her about the statute's terminology,
goals, and structure.so Conversely, any judge who is determined to
be willful is unaffected by methodology. If she cannot shop the leg
islative history for friendly cites, she will shop dictionaries, canons
of statutory construction, or statutory precedents. Keep this point
in mind as we explore the next set of problems that the new textual
ism needs to consider.
* * *

The first two dilemmas for the new textualism arise out of its
proudly formalist presentation: a theory insisting that law is the ap
plication of formal authority ought to have a coherent presentation
for its own formal authorization. This is surprisingly difficult for the
new textualism to accomplish, 'not only because the Blackstonian,
common law approach to statutory interpretation the framers
would have considered instinct in Article Ill's "judicial Power" is a
chief object of attack in the Tanner Lectures, but also because this
78. Id. at 227.
79. See id.
80. See Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A
Neo·Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1993).
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and other characteristically formalist inquiries are necessarily re
gressive. That is, a formalist must demonstrate a formal authoriza
tion, presumably in the Constitution, for the rules that must be
applied in statutory cases, but in making such a demonstration the
formalist is relying on rules of constitutional interpretation, which
ought themselves to be formally demonstrated, and so on. My ini
tial set of challenges (Parts I and II) press this dilemma. The next
set of challenges (Parts III and IV) are regressive in a different way.
A formalist not only has to defend rules that must be followed, but
because rules do not apply themselves, the formalist also has to de
fend rules about rules. This is a separate dilemma for any formalist
theory, and Scalia's new textualism never adequately confronts it
either.
One consequence of this dilemma is that any formalist theory is
ultimately conventional. Scalia's approach, understood this way,
simply posits a different set of conventions than the Court's eclectic
approach - for example, excluding legislative history and most
purposive and justice-based arguments that the Court typically con
siders and sometimes finds dispositive. Indeed, Holy Trinity
Church stands for the proposition that plain text can be trumped by
contrary legislative history, statutory purpose, and public values; for
that reason the case is the natural target for Scalia in the Tanner
Lectures. The next two problems I pose for the new textualism re
lat� to the conventions Scalia insists upon. Do they better constrain
willful judges, assure greater determinacy, and save transaction
costs, as Scalia claims? Or are Scalia's conventions no more con
straining, determinate, or cheap than those he attacks?
III.

THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT

It is a truism that interpreting a text requires context. Scalia
seeks to turn this truth to his advantage. A new textualist considers
plenty of context for figuring out the plain meaning of a statutory
provision: the whole statute in which the provision is situated, dic
tionaries and grammar books, at least some canons of statutory
construction, and the common sense that God gave us. The new
textualist, however, will almost never consider legislative history
and usually not general statutory purpose and moral argumenta
tion. Not only is the latter context illegitimate (Scalia's formalist
argument) , but it expands judicial discretion (Scalia's institutional
argument, introduced in the previous Part) and is tremendously
wasteful (Scalia's economic argument). As to the last, "fj]udges,
lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of time and
expense" because they will not have to research compendious legis
lative histories, which even under the current system rarely have
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payoffs.81 The formalist argument does not work. Do the institu
tional and economic arguments make out a better case for the new
textualism?
Returning to Holy Trinity Church, consider the full panoply of
new textualist arguments relating to the statutory prohibition
against contracting with an "alien" to pay his transportation to the
United States "to perform labor or service of any kind."82 Diction
ary definitions of "labor or service," noted above, do not clearly
resolve the issue.83 On the one hand, labor and service ordinarily
meant physical and helper work to American judges, and presuma
bly legislators, in 1885. On the other hand, the term labor could
also mean brain work, although courts in the Chinese exclusion
cases refused to read the term that broadly. And service could also
mean any work for an employer, although work by professionals
was usually deemed services rendered. "Labor or service of any
kind" might be read more broadly than simple "labor or service,"
however. But the title of the statute was narrower: "An act to pro
hibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under
contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States etc."84
Other provisions of the statute also cut in different directions.
The prohibition found in section 1 is enforced by provisions voiding
such contracts (section 2) and fining the contractor (section 3). Sec
tion 4 enforces the policy of section 1 by holding criminally ac
countable the master of a ship "who shall knowingly bring within
the United States . . . any alien laborer, mechanic or artisan" who
had contracted to perform "labor or service in the United States."85
Section 4 is in pari materia with section 1, as they both regulate the
importation of aliens coming to America under contract "to per
form labor or service in the United States." Section 4's terminology
is instructive as to the precise kinds of aliens excluded - laborers,
mechanics, and artisans (all manual workers according to contem
poraries).86 Section 4 regulates just manual workers imported for
labor or service. Is there any reason, on the face of the statute, to
separate its coverage from that of section 1? If not, section 4's rela
tively unambiguous ambit ought to inform the more ambiguous am
bit of section 1. On the other hand, section 5 specifically exempts
from the ambit of sections 1 and 4 actors, artists, lecturers, singers,
81. P. 36. I was the first, in print, to make the economic argument for tlie new textualism.
See Eskridge, supra note *, at 669, 684-85 (drawing the general efficiency point from REED
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 150-51 (1975)).
82. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332.
83. See supra notes 24-25, 27, and accompanying text.
84. 23 Stat. at 332.
85. § 4, 23 Stat. at 333.
86. See WEBSTER, supra note 24, at 79 (artisan); id. at 745 (laborer); id. at 823 (mechanic).
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and domestic servants.87 By specifically listing those exempted, the
statute can be read as signifying that all other occupations are in
cluded in sections 1-4. Note how such a reading of Section 5 im
poses a broad reading on section 4 that its words do not readily
bear.
The traditional canons of statutory construction also cut in dif
ferent directions.88 The rule of noscitur a sociis (a thing shall be
known by its associates) suggests that section 4 is applicable only to
manual workers - laborers, mechanics, artisans. The whole Act
suggests that the prohibitions in sections 1 and 4 be read to the
same effect, as two ways of addressing the general problem of aliens
imported "to perform labor or service" in the United States. The
rule of lenity requires that any ambiguities in this criminal statute
be read against the government and in favor of the church's reading
of the law to allow ministers, at least, to be brought into the country
by contract. Such an exemption was, in fact, voted by Congress in
1891 when it amended section 5 of the 1885 statute to exempt "min
isters of any religious denomination," as well as "persons belonging
to any recognized profession. "89
On the other hand, the 1891 amendment provided that its rule
should not apply to pending prosecutions9° and, hence, would not
have applied retroactively to the 1887 prosecution of the church for
importing the pastor. Indeed, the amendment underscores the ap
plication of the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (inclusion
of one thing implies exclusion of all others) to section 5: because
ministers were not included in the enumerated textual exemptions
from the statute, ministers were excluded from the exemptions.
The negative implication canon can also be used to argue that be
cause Congress in section 4 specified the aliens imported as manual
workers, its failure to use similar terminology in section 1 is signifi
cant proof of a broader application.91 Commenting on the Tanner
Lectures, Larry Tribe countered with the canon of avoiding consti
tutional questions: construe the statute to avoid free exercise

87. See § 5, 23

Stat. at

333.

88. The Tanner Lectures accept some of the canons and criticize others, pp. 25-29, but
Scalia himself relies heavily on substantive as well as linguistic canons in his capacity as a
justice. See infra Part IV.
89. See Act

of Mar.

90. See § 12, 26

3, 1891,

Stat. at

ch.

551, § 5, 26

Stat.

1084, 1085.

1086.

91. On the other hand, section S's exemptions apply to section 4 just as much as to sec
tion 1 - yet were completely unnecessary if section 4 applied just to manual workers. At
least as to section 4, the inclusio unius canon cannot apply because the statute was not
drafted coherently. Is there reason to believe that the interaction of sections 1 and 5 was any
better considered?
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problems, which would allow the minister in as a "lecturer," one of
section S's exempted classes.92
Does a textualist methodology demonstrate, objectively and
clearly, that the importation of the pastor was "within the statute:
end of case" (p. 20)? Does it also therefore demonstrate that the
Court in Holy Trinity Church got the result as well as the reasoning
100% wrong? I don't see how. Nor do I see how this sort of meth
odology narrows the options of Scalia's bete noire, the willful judge.
If such a judge wanted to allow importation of the pastor, he could
emphasize the primary dictionary meanings (in 188S) of section l's
terms "labor" and "service," the title of the statute, the narrow ar
ticulation of the statute's ambit in section 4, and the rule of lenity.
If such a judge wanted to disallow the importation, he could empha
size the broader secondary dictionary definitions (in 1885) of "la
bor" and "service," section l's broad exclusion of labor or service
"of any kind," section S's specific exemptions, and the inclusio
unius canon. The willful judge can "look over the heads of the
crowd and pick out his friends" (p. 36). Even "honest textualists"
will disagree. I consider Scalia an honest textualist, and he thinks
the text supported the prosecution; Scalia would probably return
the favor and accept me as an equally honest textualist - I am not
just trying to make trouble for him - yet I think the textual argu
ments cut against the prosecution, on the whole.
I have been less persuaded of the determinacy of the textualist
methodology than Scalia has, and Holy Trinity Church is simply the
most recent illustration of our disagreement on this score.93 I have
argued that legislative history in some cases could usefully narrow
or correct the judge's options: ambiguities in text can sometimes be
resolved, and resolved correctly, by consulting the legislative his
tory. Immediately after I made that argument, the British House of
Lords changed its mind about the meaning of a tax statute after the
taxpayer, in petitioning for rehearing, presented the Lordships with
the legislative history of a provision the Lords thought had a plain
meaning supportive of the government. In Pepper v. Hart,94 the
92. Pp. 92-93. Tribe makes no analytical argument for the proposition that the term "lec
turer" might have been thought, in 1885, to include ministers. That is not the first, or second,
or third, meaning that leaps to mind even today. Moreover, in 1885 or 1892, there was no
free exercise precedent suggesting that a general exclusionary rule incidentally affecting the
free exercise with r�ligion had any constitutional problem. See Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting a similar free exercise claim by Mormons); see also Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
93. See Eskridge. supra note *, at 675-76; see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, chs. 1 & 7;
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26 (1994).
94. 3 W.L.R. 1032 (H.L. 1992). For American examples, see, for example, INS v. Car
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Pro
tection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
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House of Lords not only found the legislative history dramatically
persuasive, but in the same case announced that they were aban
doning the long-held English equivalent of the new textualism, a
rule excluding consideration of legislative debates from statutory
interpretation by judges. Is Holy Trinity Church such a case where
legislative history narrows options and contributes to the right
answer?
Brewer's opinion for the Court relied on the Senate committee
report statement that it considered "labor or service" to include
only "manual labor or service." The committee regretted that it
had not included such terminology in the bill and could not offer a
floor amendment to add the term "manual," but the Congress was
ready to adjourn and time did not permit either redrafting or
amendment.95 Brewer concluded from this evidence, and from
more general statements in the House report and a lower court
opinion to the same effect, that the statute was only aimed at
preventing "cheap unskilled labor" from entering the country, not
"brain toilers," and certainly not "Christian ministers."96
This evidence would seem to resolve the textual ambiguities in
the way I was already leaning, toward lenity: the statute does not
clearly enough cover the pastor. My Georgetown colleague Adrian
Vermeule, however, has done a thorough legislative archaeology of
the 1885 statute that supersedes Brewer's superficial treatment.97
As Vermeule points out, the alien contract labor bill was not en
acted in 1884, as the Senate committee had hoped, and was brought
up in the 1885 session of the 48th Congress, just before the Cleve
land administration took office. A lengthy debate was had on the
bill in Congress, especially in the Senate, and the bill was amended
in various minor ways. Among the amendments were those ex
panding the exempted classes, but no amendment was even pro
posed to make clear that "labor" referred only to "manual labor."
Indeed, when pressed by an opponent of the bill, who argued that
section 5 discriminated against "other classes of professional men"
by granting exemptions to singers and lecturers and actors, but not
to others similarly useful for the public, Senator Blair, the floor
manager, seemed to concede that section 1 applied to brain toilers
as well as manual ones.
Mr. MORGAN: . . [I]f [the alien] happens to be a lawyer, an artist, a
.

painter, an engraver, a sculptor, a great author, or what not, and he
comes under employment to write for a newspaper, or to write books,

95. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464-65 (1892) (quoting
SENATE CoMM. ON EDUCATION, 48TH CoNG., lsT SESs., REPORT, reprinted in 15 CONG. REc.
6059 (1884)).
96. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-65.
97. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits ofJudicial Competence: The
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
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or to paint pictures . . . he comes under the general provisions of the
bill.

Mr. BLAIR: The Senator will observe that it is only the importation
of such people under contract to labor that is prohibited.
. I understand.

Mr. MORGAN: .

.

Mr. BLAIR: If that class of people are liable to become the subject
matter of such importation, then the bill applies to them. Perhaps the
bill ought to be fu.rther amended.
MR. MORGAN: . . I shall propose when we get to it to put an
amendment in there. I want to associate with the lecturers and sing
.

ers and actors, painters, sculptors [etc.], or any person having special
skill in any business, art, trade or profession.98

The House floor manager, Representative Hopkins, generally
opined, in response to an inquiry about agricultural laborers, that
the bill "prohibits the importation under contract of all classes with
the exceptions named in the bill."99 Vermeule believes that these
exchanges establish that the legislative deal was to apply the statute
to brain as well as manual toilers.
If that were so, Holy Trinity Church would be like Pepper v.
Hart, another example of the hypothesis that legislative history will
sometimes clearly and helpfully resolve textual ambiguity.100 But it
is not so clear in Holy Trinity Church. Even if the justices had
looked at the full panoply of legislative history usefully retrieved by
Vermeule, I doubt that they would have accepted Vermeule's read
ing in 1892. It is important, at the outset, to remember that legisla
tive history can be useful for three different interpretive purposes:
(1) specific intent of the legislature, which is most relevant to inten
tionalist theories; (2) general intent or goals of the statute, relevant
to legal process theories; and (3) meta-intent, or background under
standings about language· and terminology (relevant to textualists)
as well as values and norms (relevant to normativists).
Start, as Vermeule does, with specific intent. The Morgan-Blair
exchange is the closest statement on point, but it is not quite the
smoking gun Vermeule makes it out to be. Morgan was baiting
Blair, who was vague in his response. Blair's whine that maybe the
bill should be amended to limit its ambit to manual toil was
98. 16 CONG. REc. 1633 (1885) (exchange between Sens. Morgan and Blair) (emphasis
added).
99. 16 CONG. REc. 2032 (1885).
100. Vermeule, supra note 97, suggests that Holy Trinity Church might be evidence that
courts are not institutionally competent to handle legislative materials but properly concedes
that his suggestion is undercut by the novelty of the Court's approach as of 1892. Because
legislative history had never been so dispositive before 1892, see EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, at
208-09, the parties briefed it most unhelpfully (the church giving a misleading fragment of the
history, the government ignoring it altogether), and the Court was not inclined to do extra
research. Perusal of the Court's deployment of legislative history in the last generation sug
gests to me that judges are more thorough, sophisticated, and critical in their use of such
materials than Brewer was.
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matched by Morgan's counter-whine that he would offer an amend
ment to include all other professionals. Neither senator offered
such an amendment,101 and no one else in the lengthy Senate de
bate mentioned the issue. More importantly, neither Morgan nor
any prominent senator thought it conceivable that the bill would
exclude ministers.102 At least one prominent supporter of the bill,
Senator John Sherman, opined that section 1, as written, was aimed
at "men who come here under special contracts, mostly in large
numbers, to work at largely reduced pay for the benefit of corpora
tions."103 It would appear reasonable to think that Sherman, a ma
jor supporter of the bill, and not Morgan, the most garrulous
opponent of the bill, accurately characterized the import of the
bill's ambit. When the federal court in the Southern District of
New York construed the act, Scalia-like, to apply to the Holy Trin
ity Church, Congress immediately amended the law to exempt min
isters and professionals generally. The legislative history of the
1891 amendment establishes that it was specifically a response to
the lower court opinion in Holy Trinity Church.104 Reversing the
lower court in Holy Trinity Church, the Supreme Court did not
mention the 1891 statute, which by its terms did not apply to "pend
ing proceedings,"105 but the Court later opined that the 1891
amendment was a clarification rather than a change.106
The legislative history is also relevant in what it shows about the
purpose of the statute, how the sections of the statute fit together,
and how language was used by the senators. All the supporters of
the bill who spoke during the floor debates saw its purpose to be
101. Contrary to his attack on the bill, Morgan offered an amendment to add "artisans"
- not professionals or writers - to the list of those exempted. The amendment was re·
jected. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1837 (1885).
102. Morgan specifically considered exempt those "[p]eople who can instruct us in morals
and religion and in every species of elevation by lectures." 16 CoNG. REc. 1633 (1885). That
statement refers to section S's exemption of "lecturers," which does not necessarily cover all
or any ministers. It is significant, however, that the troublemaking Morgan neglected to tor
ture Blair on that point. Morgan's objection that some classes of artists were exempt, while
others were not, could have been much strengthened by the further point that a religious
"lecturer" was exempt from the prohibitions, but a minister was not. It seems possible that
even Morgan was assuming that ministers were not covered.
103. 16 CoNG. REc. 1635 (1885) (statement of Sen. Sherman). Another supporter felt
the bill was too broadly drafted, but only because it might thwart foreign firms seeking to
relocate in the United States and bring some "laborers" with them. 16 CoNG. REc. 1635
(1885) (statement of Sen. McPherson).
104. See 21 CoNG. REc. 9439 (1890) (statement of Rep. Buchanan) (specifically adverting
to the lower court decision); 21 CoNG. REc. 10,466-67 (1890) (discussing the need to exempt
ministers).
105. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 12, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086.
106. See United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 265 (1896) (exempting a chemist from the
unamended 1885 statute based on Holy Trinity Church but invoking the 1891 amendment as
support); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 1635 (1885) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (arguing the bill
may be badly drafted, like the Chinese exclusion statutes, which were clarified by subsequent
amendments).
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preventing the importation of "laborers" who would undermine the
wage position of American wage earners,107 the precise purpose ar
ticulated in the committee reports and in the Supreme Court opin
ion. The supporters saw the bill as of the same kind as, and in part
copied from, the Chinese exclusion statutes,108 which courts, as
noted above, interpreted to exempt actors and the like (that case
law probably inspired some of the exemptions listed in section 5).
All the senators who spoke on the issue, particularly the sponsor,
Senator Blair, saw sections 1 and 4 to be regulating precisely the
same classes of immigrants;109 The sponsor and other senators used
the term "labor" to refer only to manual work and "laborers" to
refer only to manual workers,110 consistent with the courts' analysis
of the Chinese exclusion statutes and treaties. No one in the exten
sive debates referred to "service" independently of "labor," sug
gesting the focus was on the latter term. On the other hand, the
sponsors also realized that "manual labor" would have been a bet
ter term to assure the statute would have been limited to the evil it
was designed to suppress.111 In this respect, it is significant that
supporters and opponents alike complained that the bill was badly,
indeed loosely, drafted and lamented that Congress did not have
time to rewrite it completely.112
107. See, e.g., 16 CONG. REc. 1781-82 (1885) (Sen. Platt); 16 CoNG. REc. 1780 (1885)
(Sen. Vest); 16 CONG. REc. 1778 (1885) (Sen. Miller); 16 CoNG. REc. 1634 (1885) (Sen. Sher
man); 16 CoNG. REc. 1626 (1885) (Sen. Blair).
108. See 16 CONG. REc. 1630 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair) (noting that section 4 of the
bill was copied from a similar provision in the 1882 Chinese exclusion law); 16 CONG. REc.
(1885) (statement of Sen. Blair) (noting that the goal of the bill was to "prevent substantially
the cooly practices" to which both Europe and China contributed). Senator Morgan ob
jected to the "cooly" parallel and explained the Chinese exclusion laws as seeking to protect
against bringing "any more of the inferior Asiatic or African races into this land" and not just
to protect American laborers. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1631 (1885). Senator Sherman responded
to Morgan and supported the class basis, rather than the race basis, for the Chinese legisla
tion. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1634 (1885); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 1780 (1885) (statement of Sen.
Vest).
109. Senator Blair, the floor manager, said that section 4:
is aimed . . . against the man who knowingly brings an immigrant from foreign shores to
our own, who comes here under and by virtue of a contract such as is prohibited by the
bill. It seems to me that if we are to legislate on the subject at all it is folly not to reach
this man who is the chief agent in the actual perpetration of the crime.
16 CoNG. REc. 1630 (1885); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 1785 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair); 16
CoNG. REc. 1779 (1885) (statement of Sen. Miller); 16 CoNG. REc. 1629 (1885) (statement of
Sen. McPherson); 16 CoNG. REc. 1626 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair).
110. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1628 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair) (explaining a proviso in
section 5 that made an allowance for employers to import "skilled workmen in foreign coun
tries to perform labor in the United States" for infant industries); see also 16 CONG. REc.
1787 (1885) (statement of Sen. Harrison); 16 CONG. REc. 1785 (1885) (statement of Sen.
Call); 16 CoNG. REc. 1784 (1885) (statement of Sen. Sherman); 16 CoNG. REc. 1783 (1885)
(statement of Sen. Dawes); 16 CoNG. REc. 1781-82 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt); 16
CoNG. REc. 1779 (1885) (statement of Sen. Miller).
111. 15 CoNG. REc. 6059 (1884) (Sen. Blair).
112. See, e.g., 15 CoNG. REc. 5354 (1884) (Rep. Kelley); 16 CoNG. REc. 1622-23 (1885)
(Sen. Hawley); 16 CoNG. REc. 1625 (1885) (Sen. Ingalls); 16 CONG. REc. 1635 (1885) (Sen.
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On the whole, this latter evidence reinforces my impression that
the plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the
rule of lenity in the Case of the Imported Pastor and, further, leaves
me open to the possibility in future cases that the statute might be
limited, in the way section 4 is limited, to laborers, artisans, and
mechanics - manual workers. But I do not find the legislative his
tory one-sided, for I am strongly impressed by the arguments sug
gested by Vermeule: the Senate sponsor assured the Senate that
section l's prohibition swept beyond the evil addressed by the bill,
the sponsors never proposed an amendment that could have clearly
narrowed the statute to "manual labor" and "manual service," and
everyone considered section 5 to be the repository of exhaustively
considered and debated exemptions (greatly strengthening the
otherwise dubious inclusio unius argument against Brewer's result).
Like the arguments from statutory text, the arguments from legisla
tive history provide ammunition for both sides in Holy Trinity
Church, although my own reading does not refute my impression
that the statute is not clearly enough applicable to a minister to
escape the rule of lenity.
Holy Trinity Church, therefore, is a case where legislative his
tory does little work, beyond buttressing already-formed impres
sions. Neither Scalia nor I - nor Brewer nor Vermeule, by the way
- would change our text-based votes after examining the legisla
tive history. Although I think as a formal matter of textual con
struction that Scalia gets it wrong in Holy Trinity Church, he would
not get it right if I required him to read the legislative history and he could say the same about me. Thus, although the formalist
and institutional arguments for excluding legislative history remain
unproven or unfounded, the economic argument is not o.nly plausi
ble, but receives some support from my analysis of Holy Trinity
Church. Even with the aid of hours of legislative history reading
which refutes much of Brewer's opinion in the case, I am left where
I was before, as would be the large majority of other interpreters.113
Sherman); 16 CONG. REc. 1780 (1885) (Sen. Vest). Senator Blair admitted that the bill was
drafted outside Congress "by the men whose interests it undertakes to guard and conserve."
16 CoNG. REc. 1622 (1885). Senator Platt co�plained that these drafters were insufficiently
"familiar with legal phraseology" and therefore drafted a bill which was "crude" and "not
properly drawn to effectuate the purposes of those who believe in the principle of the bill."
16 CoNG. REc. 1781 (1885). Some supporters of the bill opined that any imperfections could
be corrected by subsequent amendment. 16 CONG. REc. 1635 (1885) (Sen. Sherman).
113. I offer this thought experiment from my 1997 fall term Legislation class at
Georgetown. I asked all the students to bring with them to the Holy Trinity Church class a
statement of their vote and reasons for it. 1\vo-thirds of those enrolled in the class complied
(I made the mistake of not making the exercise compulsory); by a margin of 38 to 33 the
students followed the statutory plain meaning and dissented from the Court's opinion. I
divided the students into two groups and gave each group separate handouts detailing addi
tional textual evidence (dictionary definitions and section 4) and legislative history
(Vermeule's smoking guns, plus general statements of purpose and use of the term "labor").
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The only potential value - but a big one! - of a rule excluding
resort to legislative history is that it might save a lot of wasted effort
- expensive research and analysis that have no payoff.
Pause for a moment to review the cost-benefit calculus for
Scalia's rule excluding legislative history. The benefits of an exclu
sionary rule would be:
·

1. the net savings in research costs by attorneys, law clerks, and
others analyzing statutory issues;114

2. the rule of law and democracy benefit, if excluding legislative his
tory reduces judicial discretion or uncertainty in statutory cases;

3. the rule of law and democracy benefit, if excluding legislative his
tory encourages the legislative process to write statutes that more
transparently reveal the deals and rules agreed upon.

My judgment is that benefit (1) involves a very large number of
dollars, while benefits (2) and (3) are virtually nil.
Offset against the benefits of an exclusionary rule, of course,
must be the costs of such a rule:
1. if the exclusionary rule were applied to existing statutes,115 the rule
of law, democracy, and reliance costs of negating deals made clear
in the legislative history but not in the statutory text;

2. new errors, if any, that would be introduced by excluding legisla
tive history, including greater need for the legislative process to
sacrifice parts of its limited agenda to monitor and respond to tex
tualist decisions;

3. increased willingness of judges to overrule agency interpretatiqns
of statutes because the agency is influenced by legislative expecta
tions that judges think contrary to statutory text.116

The handouts were given in reverse order for the two groups - the legislative history one
first for one group, the text one first for the other group - but the order of presentation,
surprisingly, did not affect the results: 15 of the 38 students dissenting in Holy Trinity Church
(40% of the dissenters) changed their votes after consulting the textual evidence. Four stu
dents changed their votes after consulting the new legislative history evidence, but in cross
cutting directions - two dissenters defected to the Brewer camp, and two of Brewer's disci
ples defected to dissent. After reviewing all the evidence, the students voted 23 to 46 for the
Brewer result, but with increased disdain for the sloppy process by which Brewer reached it.
114. By net savings, I mean the following: the amount of time attorneys spend on legisla
tive history research and argumentation that they would not spend under an exclusionary
rule, less the additional time they would spend doil)g other kinds of statutory research, such
as dictionary shopping and consulting professional linguists.
115. I think retroactive application of an exclusionary rule in this way would be uncon
scionable as a dirty bait and switch on poor Congress. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note
*. The new textualists and their academic allies all seem to support it, but I have never seen a
good reason for their position.
116. Merrill, supra note 14. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than
Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231 (1996); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Adminis
trative State, 95 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 749 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 550-55 (1997) (reviewing ANroNIN SCALIA ET AL., A MATIER
OF lNraRPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
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My judgment is that cost (1) is substantial, while costs (2) and (3)
are possibly substantial but, for me, too speculative for even edu
cated guesses. Overall, the cost-benefit calculus is indeterminate,
which means that Scalia's approach requires further study.

IV.

THE PROBLEM OF LOOSE CANONS

Important to my resolution of the Case of the Imported Pastor
is the rule of lenity. Unlike Scalia, I find the text of the alien con
tract labor law replete with ambiguities. The rule of lenity demands
that penal statutes, such as this one (the Church was assessed a
$1000 fine but was not imprisoned), be construed in favor of the
accused when its application is ambiguous. The Tanner Lectures
grudgingly accept the validity of the rule of lenity, but only by rea
son of "sheer antiquity" (p. 29). As for the other canons of statu
tory construction, Scalia offers himself as a skeptic. "To the honest
textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot
of trouble" and, indeed, "increase the unpredictability, if not arbi
trariness of judicial decisions" (p. 28).
Scalia's position reveals deep problems for his philosophy of in
terpretation. First, as noted above, a formalist theory has got to
have rules about rules. It is not enough to say, follow the ordinary
meaning of plain texts, without providing secondary rules about
how to determine such meaning.117 The canons are rules about
rules. A textualist, therefore, is likely to follow and endorse
textual-meaning canons, which Scalia surely does. His criticism
must be limited to the substantive canons such as the rule of lenity,
which he nonetheless accepts for "antiquity" reasons. This conces
sion is potentially expansive, because the "dice-loading rules" (p.
28) Scalia criticizes are for the most part entrenched in judicial
practice and precedent - even more so than the hated use of legis
lative history. Not only would it be hard for a new textualist to
dislodge these rules from their "canonical" place in American law,
but the textualist who refuses to consider legislative history will be
sorely tempted to rely on those rules to provide necessary context
and analysis for deciding issues of interpretation. This latter idea is
suggested by the pre-Pepper v. Hart practice in the United King
dom and by the practice in states not having much usable legislative
history. But the problem is that the substantive, dice-loading ca
nons risk the normative appeal of the new textualism: they are, as
Scalia says, potentially undemocratic because they are judge-made
presumptions and rules that Congress has a hard time trumping;
potentially lawless because they afford the willful judge a variety of
117. That is, unless one simply retreats to an intuitionist "I know it when I see it" ap·
proach to plain meaning. That is a possible stance, but I would think not appealing to a
formalist who relies on objectivity and neutrality.

May 1998]

Textualism

1543

sources for massaging different meanings out of the same text; and
potentially destabilizing if judges succumb to the temptation of cre
ating new canons or adjusting old ones to their changing tastes. 118
Scalia's Tanner Lectures ask: "Can we really just decree that we
interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean less or more
than what they fairly say?" His answer: "I doubt it" (p. 29). "What
they fairly say" is loaded with convention. Indeed, the most pro
ductive use of legislative history is to help judges figure out what
conventions Congress was assuming or invoking (see my discussion
of the history in Holy Trinity Church). The longstanding substan
tive canons can be viewed as conventions underlying congressional
deliberations. Indeed, between 1987 and 1994, the Rehnquist Court
had reason to apply no fewer than seventy-nine different substan
tive presumptions, clear statement rules, and super-strong clear
statement rules in literally hundreds of statutory cases.119 This
would seem defensible, except that in many of the cases the Court
was subtly playing with or altering the conventions - creating new
presumptions, elevating old presumptions to the status of clear
statement rules, and reconfiguring old clear statement rules as
super-strong clear statement rules, requiring manifest clarity from
Congress.12° Scalia joined or wrote the Court's opinion in almost
all of the cases where the Court invoked or revised these substan
tive canons. Most surprising is that he wrote the opinion for the
Court in one of the most aggressive and dynamic deployments of a
substantive canon in recent memory.

will

The issue in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation121 was under
what circumstances the proceeds of a foreclosure sale of mortgaged
real estate satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's rule nullifying property
transfers by insolvent debtors within a year of bankruptcy, unless
they are in exchange for "a reasonably equivalent value."122 Based
on the statutory requirement of reasonably equivalent value, federal
appeals courts refused to credit foreclosure transfers without a
showing of at least rough market equivalence; disagreeing with its
sibling circuits, the Ninth Circuit agreed that such was the plain
meaning of the statute but invoked policy reasons to hold the rea
sonably equivalent value requirement satisfied by whatever price
118. See Eskridge, supra note *, at 683-84.
119. The cases are collected in Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 93, at 101-08.
120. For examples of reconfigured substantive canons, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 {1991); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 {1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, at 275-97; William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Law
making, 45 VAND. L. RE.v. 593 {1992).
121. 511 U.S. 531 {1994).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 548{a){2) {1988).
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the property fetched in a foreclosure sale.123 A closely divided
Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, affirmed the
nontextualist Ninth Circuit and rejected the various equivalence
rules created by the textualist circuits. The Court held that, so long
as the relevant state procedures were followed, whatever price the
sale generated - even $1
satisfied the Bankruptcy Code. BFP is
a surprising decision for a textualist, as Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion charged.124 Scalia stoicly asserted that "reasonable
equivalent value" is ambiguous language.125 It is ambiguous in
some respects, but it unambiguously forecloses a "whatever you
got" approach, as the Ninth Circuit opinion cheerfully conceded.
For the lower court, the plain meaning needed to be compromised,
because it would inject substantial uncertainty into the foreclosure
sale bidding process and would undermine the smooth functioning
of local real estate markets. The lower court also invoked the spirit
of federalism, respecting state power in areas of traditional alloca
tive regulation.126 Holy Trinity Church, Batman!
-

Although affirming, Scalia did not defend his choice as an open
policy decision, as the Ninth Circuit did. Rather, he read the text in
light of the super-strong rule against interpreting federal statutes to
invade state governmental decisionmaking that the Court had just
created in Gregory v. Ashcroft. 127 Scalia's opinion reasoned that
123. See In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 {9th Cir. 1992). The lower court decisions to the
contrary are listed in BFP, 511 U.S. at 536.
124. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 552-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). Compare PUD No. 1 of Jeffer
son County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 724 {1994) {Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., dissenting) (apparent plain meaning of statute trumped by "larger statutory frame
work" and statute's balance of federal-state interests) with 511 U.S. at 723 {Stevens, J., con
curring) (asserting that the plain meaning of the statute makes this an easy case and that
there is no textualist basis for dissenting, as Scalia does).
125.

See BFP,

511 U.S. at 546-47.

126. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148-49. I have endorsed this and other values as sound bases
for a constitutional policy of federalism. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Stead
ying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1447 {1995).
127. 501 U.S. 452 {1991). The majority opinion in Gregory, joined by Justice Scalia, cre
ated a new super-strong clear statement rule to interpret the age discrimination law to ex
empt state appointed judges. The concurring opinion by Justice White showed that the same
result flowed from ordinary textualist precepts. The Tanner Lectures are overall more con
sistent with the White approach.

In the Tanner Lectures, Scalia adds an odd caveat for congressional elimination of state
sovereign immunity, and by analogy, for congressional regulation of the states qua states:
because such legislation is "an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be explic
itly decreed rather than offhandedly implied - so something like a 'clear statement' rule is
merely normal interpretation." P. 29. Aside from the fact that such legislation is no longer
extraordinary - see the many labor, civil rights, and Indian tribe statutes - an unusual act
does not require a clearer statement than a usual act, unless there is also a normative reason
to require a more focused, specific statement. For example, it is highly unusual for Congress
to enact legislation that helps gay people. Should that be sufficient reason to require a super
clear statement before a statute can be interpreted for the benefit of gay people? See also
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) {Scalia, J., dissenting) {sharply criticizing statu-
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the statute is not sufficiently "clear and manifest" in order to "dis
place traditional State regulation" of foreclosure sales.128 But the
whole point of a federal bankruptcy law is to replace normal rules
of state contract and property law with the fresh-start and fairness
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.129 The fresh-start provisions
supplant state law by nullifying outstanding debts and liens. The
fairness provisions supplant state law by nullifying transactions
taken by the debtor to cheat some creditors out of their fair share.
Congress . has authority to pass such legislation pursuant to the
bankruptcy power of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, and the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI requires the states to enforce such
statutes in place of their own. Not only was it clear that Congress
intended to displace state law, but Gregory was not even formally ,
applicable. · Scalia was relying on an expanded version of the prior
case: Gregory involved federal regulation of state governments
themselves; Scalia expanded it to create, for the one case, a rule
requiring a super-strong clear statement before the Court would
construe the Bankruptcy Code to preempt state property law.13o
The result in BFP came as a surprise to most: all the appellate
courts except the Ninth Circuit thought it precluded by the statu
tory text, Congress had specifically considered and rejected the re
sult, and most of the bankruptcy bar felt a contrary result mandated
by the rule of law, even if not by good policy. Scalia's canonical
reasoning in BFP came as a surprise to everybody: neither the
Ninth Circuit (the court being affirmed) nor the respondent (the
winning party) had even cited Gregory.
BFP is a dramatic illustration of Scalia's warning that, "[t]o the
honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions
are a lot of trouble" (p. 28). But it also illustrates how a textualism
refusing to consider the legislative context of statutes is going to be
tempted not only to rely on substantive canons, but also to develop
them, common law style. If that happens, as new canons are cre
ated or strengthened and old ones narrowed as Supreme Court
tory interpretation inference from Congress's failure to signal departure from longstanding
policy). But Scalia refuses to present normative dimensions to his rules or his practice. Part
VI of this review argues that Scalia does not escape normativity, and this canon and the
dozens like it that Scalia endorses and vigorously applies are normative presumptions that
are not neutral.
128. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 544, 544-45 n.8 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72, 79 (1990) and discussing Gregory).
129. BFP, 511 U.S. at 565-69 (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Scalia had rejected such an aggressive canon for determining statutory preemption
in a case involving federal regulation of smoking. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 544-48 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing against
a narrow construction of express federal statutory provisions preempting state police power
regulations). Cippollone, by the way, recognizes a presumption against federal preemption
of state law, but a presumption that can be more easily rebutted than the super-strong clear
statement rule of Gregory.
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composition changes, the honest textualist becomes just as unpre
dictable as, and may even come to resemble, her doppelganger the
willful judge.
The phenomenon of shopping the canons - picking out the
friendly ones and ignoring or explaining away the rest - afflicts not
only BFP and other deployments of the substantive canons, but
also deployment of text-based canons as well. Consider the debate
in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T. 131 Section 203(a) of
the Communications Act of 1934132 requires communications com
mon carriers to file schedules of charges and conditions of service
with the FCC; section 203(b)(2) permits the FCC to "modify any
requirement made by or under the authority of this section."133 Re
sponding to the perceived need for more competition in the long
distance telephone market, the FCC between 1980 and 1992 issued
a series of orders which ultimately allowed nondominant - that is,
not-AT&T - companies to avoid the expensive process of filing
and amending tariff schedules. The Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Scalia, held that the FCC's policy violates the plain mean
ing of section 203(b)(2). The FCC argued that its authority to mod
ify any requirement of section 203 allows it in appropriate
circumstances to exempt companies from the filing requirements.
Scalia's opinion held that the authority to modify means only "to
change moderately or in minor fashion," a standard dictionary defi
µition of "modify."134 Because the FCC's orders worked a "funda
mental" rather than "minor" change in section 203's requirements,
it was not a permissible modification. This would seem like a pre
dictable, lawful, objective interpretation - until you read Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion, which invoked the same linguistic can
ons to show that "modify" can have a broader meaning.
As Scalia conceded, Webster's Third, the most frequently cited
dictionary by the Court, defines "modify" as including "to make a
basic or important change in." That would seem to support the
agency's view, which is supposed to prevail when a regulatory stat
ute is susceptible of two plausible readings, but Scalia dismissed
that use as colloquial and idiosyncratic to that dictionary.135 Scalia
131. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
132. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988).
133. 47 u.s.c. § 203(b)(2) (1988).
134. MCI, 512 U.S. at 225.
135. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 225-26, 226 n.2, 228 n.3 (explaining the Court's rejection of the
definition in WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY and related Webster's
products). Justice Scalia belittled Webster's Third for its colloquial usages, but the Court
itself relies on that dictionary more than any other, see Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512
U.S. 246, 255 (1994) (handed down three days after MCI); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries
and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1437, 1439 n.12 (1994) [hereinafter Note,
Looking It Up], including decisions written by Justice Scalia, see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507
U.S. 170, 177, 179 (1993); Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Wrigley, 507 U.S. 214, 223, 226
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was wrong, though. Other dictionaries, including the distinguished
Oxford English Dictionary, define "modify" in a way that allows
exemption of whole categories from a regulatory regime.136 Most
on point, the 1933 edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published the
year before the Communications Act was passed, defined the term
as "an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or
cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of
the subject-matter intact."137 As Stevens argued, if section 203 is
viewed "as part of a statute whose aim is to constrain monopoly
power, the Commission's decision to exempt nondominant carriers
is a rational and 'measured' adjustment to novel circumstances."138
It is hard to explain MCI as simply an exercise in predictable
text application. Instead, it exemplifies the Court's increasing dic
tionary shopping and suggests the hypothesis that the linguistic or
text-based canons are just as manipulable as the substantive c<;m
ons.139 Like legislative history, the canons and the dictionaries are
a "broad playing field," and "there is something for everybody. As
Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the
heads of the crowd and pick out your friends" (p. 36).
* * *

Problems 1 and 2 pose logical dilemmas for Scalia's particular
brand of textualism. Problems 3 and 4 question whether Scalia's
methodology can deliver the greater objectivity, predictability, and
determinacy he promises in the Tanner Lectures. A final set of
problems relate to the role and capacity of judges. The Tanner Lec
tures are critical of the common law judge as an anachronism in the
modem administrative state. This is a striking and important cri
tique. From Roscoe Pound to Learned Hand to Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks to Antonin Scalia, scholars and judges of this century
have been asking this question. Now that legislation has displaced
(1992); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). Moreover, the Court traditionally has
followed a word's "ordinary" meaning rather than its "technical" meaning. See Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (insisting upon colloquial meaning of "bias
or prejudice," thereby importing an unstated "invidiousness" requirement into the statute at
issue).
136. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989) (providing this illustration
from 1610: "For so Mariana modefies his Doctrine, that the Prince should not execute any
Clergy man, though hee deser[v]e it.").
137. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1198 (3d ed. 1933). The Court has been hopelessly in
consistent in its usage of particular dictionaries and has not paid attention to whether the
dates of the enactment of the statute and of the publication of the dictionary it uses to con
strue the statute correspond. See Note, Looking It Up, supra note 135, at 1447-48 (suggesting
that the Court has engaged in dictionary shopping - that is, finding dictionaries to support
results being driven by other factors).
138. MCI, 512 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50 (1993);
Note, Looking It Up, supra note 135 (providing an excellent critique of the Court's increasing
reliance on dictionaries).
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the common law as our main source of authority, is the common
law method of incremental case-by-case judgment, working by anal
ogy from authorities and precedents to unanticipated facts - is that
method obsolete? Scalia thinks that it is and that the new textual
ism embodies a better institutional role for the Court. I am more
dubious on both scores, for reasons explored in the following
problems.

V. THE PROBLEM

'
OF THE JU DICIARY S INSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN
A D EMOCRACY

One criticism of Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation in
as well as in Holy Trinity Church, is that it disrupts congres
sionally approved practice. Congress considered the federalism
concerns articulated by Scalia and the Ninth Circuit when it
amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, but was unmoved by the
federalism arguments that moved the Court: Congress rejected an
amendment which would have guaranteed the integrity of state
foreclosure sales.140 In contrast, the Court in Holy Trinity Church
interpreted the immigration law precisely as Congress rewrote it in
1891. Because the 1891 amendment was not retroactive,141 Scalia
would have considered it irrelevant, but his result would have cre
ated an incoherent treatment of imported ministers, with no sup
port from Congress or the political process.
I have criticized Scalia's application of plain meaning above, but
assume that he is right about plain meaning in both BFP and Holy
Trinity Church but that I am right about the political equilibrium in
both cases. In that event, the new textualism opens up a tension
between the rule of law and democracy that softer versions of textu
alism - follow the text but check it against the legislative history avoid. Majority-based choices in that event would more often be
trumped by dictionary-toting,142 grammar-minded judges holding
Congress to the letter of what it writes. If so, the new textualist is
less responsive to democratic desires than the faithful agent, the
statutory interpreter who tries to figure out what the principal
would have her do under the circumstances.143 The faithful agent is
BFP,

140. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 550 n.1, 554 n.6, 555-56, 567-70
{1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. The amendment was by its terms not retroactive. Note, however, that Scalia re
quires a super-strong clear statement of retroactivity, another example of the substantive
canons which he insists on making more rather than less aggressive. See Landgraf v. USI
Fiim Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 {1994) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
142. But tote not

Webster's Third! See MCI,

512 U.S. 218.

143. The faithful agent is developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr. , Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322-30 {1989). See also RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 269-73 {1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ. 281 {1989); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L.
REv. 1165 {1993).
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a more cooperative partner in the enterprise of statutory interpreta
tion and better reflects the Court's role as a partner with Congress
in the process of statutory law elaboration.
.

Consider this homely example: Scalia, a hotel manager, tells
me, his employee, to "gather all the ashtrays in the public areas of
the hotel and put them in my office by 2:00 p.m. today, " while he is
dining. I diligently collect the ashtrays until I come to an elevator
bank, where a metal ashtray is bolted onto the wall. Should I rip it
off? A pragmatic agent would leave it on the wall, construing "all
ashtrays" to exclude those whose removal would be unduly costly, a
judgment call. It is not clear what the new textualist would do.
When I have posed this hypothetical in Legislation classes, some
Scalians rip the ashtrays off the wall, and others do not because
they consider the textual command "absurd" in those circum
stances. The former are honest textualists, but crummy agents. I
don't know how Scalia would answer the ashtrays example; but up
holding the prosecution in Holy Trinity Church in 1892 approaches
that level of unreasonableness, assuming the accuracy of Brewer's
description of Congress' values, goals, and beliefs. Why shouldn't
interpreters be willing to accommodate plain meaning to fit the pur
pose of the enterprise, other goals pursued by the principal, and
common values? Scalia makes three different kinds of arguments
against such an approach.
First, Scalia argues that pragmatic approaches are too open
ended, providing increased opportunities for the· judge to read her
own preferences into directives and undermining the predictability
and determinacy of law. The "discretion of judges" argument is a
red herring. All interpretive methodologies, including textual ones,
present the willful judge with discretionary choices, as discussed
above. More importantly, it is less productive to focus on the will
ful judge and more productive to focus on the cooperative judge, as
the prototype: not only are most judges cooperative rather than
willful, but the assumption of cooperativeness is more consistent
with the philosophy underlying Article III and may itself contribute
to a judicial culture where willfulness is stigmatized. Most impor
tantly, judges like other state officials are concretely constrained by
practice
the feedback they get from Congress, lower courts,
agencies, and the citizenry.
-

Second, Scalia maintains that a strict textual approach is ulti
mately democracy-enhancing. "What is of paramount importance
is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of language it
adopts."144 Thus, even when the Court interprets a statute contrary
to congressional expectations in a particular case, this may not be

'
144. Fmley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
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countermajoritarian in the longer run if Congress learns a valuable
rule which can guide its future statutory drafting efforts. Ulti
mately, the new textualism might be not only democratic, but also
might induce Congress to change its way of writing statutes so that
the democratic process actually works better. Specifically, by dis
couraging lawmaking through plants in the legislative history, Scalia
might encourage the legislative process to be more transparent
about what deals are struck and what trade-offs are made to obtain
statutory enactments.145
Would the new textualism, if adopted, be the sort of tough love
that would impel Congress to write clearer statutes and make more
transparent policy choices?146 It is too early to tell whether the
Supreme Court's increasingly, but still far from wholly, textualist
methodology has affected or will affect Congress's approach to stat
ute writing. One would expect that Congress would move more
material from committee reports to the statute itself. Apart from
whatever Article I, Section 7 satisfaction might be derived from
that, would it be a beneficial change? What would be the costs?
The main cost would be the Court's imposition on Congress's
limited agenda.147 Textualist decisions are less likely to reflect orig
inal congressional preferences and much less likely to reflect ongo
ing congressional preferences (BFP and Holy Trinity Church), and
so deals and compromises would be harder to reach because of less
certainty of enforcement and practical elaboration on the part of a
textualist Court.148 Congress has a severely limited agenda and,
even with large staffs, does not have the political energy to adopt
more than a fraction of the measures deserving attention. The new
textualism would theoretically require more political and technical
attention to each bill than do traditional practices, and that phe
nomenon would diminish Congress's ability to pass statutes. To be
sure, this diminished capacity would not be a cost if one viewed
congressional statute creation cynically, as Scalia does in the Tanner
Lectures (pp. 32-34) and even more explicitly in some judicial deci145. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of
Law, in THE RuLE OF LAw: NoMos XXXVI 265 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
146. If these are the goals, why not enforce the nondelegation doctrine? While Scalia
eschews this approach because there are no judicially administrable standards for the doc·
trine, MCI can best be read as a nondelegation case: the term modify is susceptible of differ
ent meanings; the Court chose the narrower meaning, for the broader one would have
effected a questionable delegation of undirected lawmaking power to the agency, in contra·
vention of Article l's command that all statutory lawmaking be directed by Congress or by
intelligible standards Congress sets.
147. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations ofStat·
utes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1994); Muriel Morisey Spence,
The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 585 (1994).
148. Textualist decisions are the ones most frequently overridden by Congress in recent
years. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci·
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347-48 (1991).
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sions.149 Such a view is not fair to Congress, however, and is at
odds with the respect that the Constitution insists be afforded to
Congress as a formal matter.150
Nor is it clear that Congress is institutionally capable of re
sponding to the new textualism by anticipating more issues and
resolving them more clearly in statutes. Tue lawmaking process is
an extended and frequently chaotic one, involving hundreds of leg
islators, staff members, executive branch officials, and lobbyists for
important proposals. In reaching compromises and holding to
gether fragile coalitions, many issues are not thoroughly considered,
and many others are not going to be anticipated even with further
deliberation. Even when issues are anticipated and considered,
they may not be easy to incorporate clearly into statutory text, for
reasons of politics, time, and drafting skill. If this is the case, as it
seems to be for at least some major legislation, the new textualism
unfairly saddles Congress with obligations it cannot always fulfill.
Perhaps the most important question is what effects diminished
congressional lawmaking and enhanced judicial disruption would
have on statutory schemes. A literature on the effect of the new
textualism on substantive areas of law, especially tax, bankruptcy,
and civil rights law is now developing. Because this literature and
the new textualism are both in their infancy, firm conclusions can
not yet be drawn. But it is significant that respected scholars in
different substantive areas have cautioned that rigidly text-based
approaches neglecting practical, political, and purposive features of
the enterprise have left lawyers and citizens confused about what is
required of them, have destabilized longstanding statutory policies,
and have produced wasteful litigation.151 Thus far, scholars have
149. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment). But see Brudney, supra note 147 (vividly disputing Scalia's account of the
legislative process generally); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legis
lative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 819 (1991).
150. If Congress is supreme in the statutory arena, as the Constitution suggests, why
shouldn't it, rather than the Court, call the shots? Congress does not want agents who do
nothing but apply plain meanings. It wants agents who make the statutory scheme work over
time or who adjust the statutory scheme to reflect new political equilibria. Recall the ashtray
hypothetical.
.
151. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Vrrginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Pro
cess of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 687 (1992) (civil rights law); William D.
Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113,
72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 193 (1996) (environmental law); Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme
Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 SUP. Cr. REv. 199 (civil rights law); Douglas M.
Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and the Definition of
"Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043 (1993) (securities law); Brud
ney, supra note 147 (labor law); Wtlliam N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? The Court/
Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991) (civil rights law); Cathe
rine L. FISk, The Last Article about the Language ofERISA Preemption? A Case Study ofthe
Failure of Textualism, 33 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996) (pension law); Philip P. Frickey, Con
gressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78
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found that the new textualism has failed to yield greater determi
nacy in even a single area of law; some of the articles have, surpris
ingly, found less predictability among judges once an area of law is
new textualized.152
There is a third reason, not offered in the Tanner Lectures but
suggested by Scalia elsewhere, why the Court might avoid openly
normative choices in statutory cases. Before presenting this third
argument, the general problem of normativity needs to be explored.
VI.

THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVITY

Scalia maintains that the Court must apply statutes as written,
without flinching. This severe positivism was not the goal of the
framers, was not written into the Constitution, was not the practice
of early American courts, and has not been the practice of Ameri
can courts in this century. Legal method has been practical rather
than dogmatic, contextual as well as textual, and normative more
than neutral.153 Has legal method been improperly conceived?
Should norms be thoroughly absent in the enterprise of statutory
interpretation? The proper interpretation in Holy Trinity Church,
in the opinion of most, involves precepts that are normative as well
as semantic. Brewer invoked the idea of a Christian Nation to in
form his reading of the statute, its legislative history, and purpose.
Tribe's comment on the Tanner Lectures emphasizes the rule that
CAL. L. REv. 1137 {1990) (Indian law); Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax
Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 445 {1993) (tax law); Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of
Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 611
(1991) (tax law); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement:
A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 175 (1992)
(environmental law); Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413 {1993) (immi
gration law); Livingston, supra note 149 (tax law); Mank, supra note 116 (environmental
law); C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order ofIllu
sory Events, 45 ARK. L. REv. 265 {1992) {bankruptcy law); James P. Nehf, Textualism in the
Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1
{1994) (consumer law); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the
Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717 {1995) (evidence law); Charles Jordan Tabb &
Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence
of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 {1991) {bankruptcy law); Michael P. Van
Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. {forthcoming 1998) (treaty inter
pretation); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Rev
enue Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 623 {1986) (tax law). A textualist approach is defended in
Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study ofthe Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993), published just before BFP was decided.
152. See Eskridge, supra note 151 (civil rights law); Herz, supra note 151 (environmental
law); Nehf, supra note 151 (consumer law). For a fascinating case study of this, see Richard J,
Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching
for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 1 {1995).
153. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAs1c
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW {William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994); DENNIS PATIERSON, LAW AND TRUTH {1996) (providing a splendid phil
osophical exploration of the thesis in the text).
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one should read a statute so as to avoid constitutional difficulties
such as reading a general statute to burden religious freedom (p.
92). My own interpretation is influenced by the rule of lenity, the
narrow statutory purpose, and the longstanding prior (to 1885)
practice of freely allowing ministers and other professionals into the
country. Only Scalia appears to reject all these normative consider
ations. But in BFP, federalism played the spiritual role for Scalia
that the Christian Nation did for Brewer in Holy Trinity Church,
and in MCI the nondelegation idea played the tiebreaking role for
Scalia that the rule of lenity does for me in Holy Trinity Church.154
Thus, it appears that norms are not absent from Scalia's interpreta
tion of statutes; he is merely influenced by different norms. This
cannot be surprising. Interpretation is always, even if uncon
sciously, normative -- even the most scrupulously neutral deci
sionmaker reads the evidence through the lens of her own
preconceptions.155
Return to the Case of the Wandering Basketball Player and the
question of whether the application of Rule 12A, Section IX(c) re
quires his suspension from the next game. Reread the rule156 and
consider the following scenarios in which a basketball player leaves
the bench during a fight under the basket:
1. The player jumps off the bench and joins the fight.
2. The player jumps off the bench, runs over to the fight, but does not
join the fight.
3. The player leaves the bench and wanders in mid-court, making no
further move toward the fight.
4. The player leaves the bench and moves as far away from the fight
as possible, lest he be tempted to join it.
5. The player leaves the bench because he needs to use the restroom,
which is behind the bleachers and well away from the fight.
6. The fight spreads, and two players end up brawling in front of the
bench. One player starts to choke the other viciously, and no offi
cial is nearby. The choked player passes out, and the attacking
player continues choking. A third player leaves the bench and pre
vents further choking.

of these variations are within the apparent plain meaning of
Rule 12, Section IX(c). Should they all trigger the suspension?
The core violation is scenario 1. This was precisely the scenario
that triggered adoption of the rule in 1994 and is one where the
bench-clearing conduct is truly dangerous for the players, the refer
ees, and the fans. The antifighting purpose of the Rule all but re-

All

154. See supra note 146. For connections between the nondelegation idea and the rule of
lenity, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345.
155. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv.
609 (1990) (reviewing the hermeneutics literature).
156. See supra note 1.
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quires its application here even if nowhere else, and the NBA has
invoked the rule in these circumstances. Scenario 2 is only slightly
removed from the core violation, for the player's behavior strongly
risks escalating the fight, which is the mischief the rule prophylacti
cally seeks to prevent.
At the other end of the spectrum, scenario 5 strikes me as no
less a violation of the letter of the rule but lies completely outside
its spirit: the bathroom scenario is far from the core activity the
rule was designed to regulate, poses virtually no danger of escalat
ing the fight, has never been the basis of an NBA suspension (that I
know of), and carries no normative taint from the perspective of
society or the NBA. Scenario 6 is within the antifighting spirit as
well as the letter of the rule, but would, in my view, be exempt
because the rule-abridging conduct is justified by the larger princi
ple of saving life or preventing serious injury. 157 Note here that a
textualist could follow my application of the rule to scenarios 5 and
6. Scalia himself has said that a statutory text need not be applied
to de minimis violations (scenario 5) or to situations where its appli
cation would be absurd (scenario 6).158 How Scalia himself or any
other new textualist would apply these precepts to my variations is,
however, as unpredictable as it would be normative. 159
The hard cases are scenarios 3 and 4. I am agnostic as to
whether suspension is appropriate for the player in scenario 4. As
to scenario 3, the Ewing case, I would interpret the rule to require
suspension. Although Ewing was within the letter of the rule, his
was not the core case that gave rise to the rule, and according to
Linda Silberman the NBA had never suspended a player for leaving
the bench and wandering at mid-court. Critical for me, however, is
157. Obviously, scenario 6 can be made much more difficult, as by leaving open the possi
bility that referees were nearby and could have stopped the choking. But it's my
hypothetical!
158. See Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231-23
(1992) (Scalia, J.) (asserting that de minimis exceptions to statutory rules are valid, so long as
they do not undermine policy of statute); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that judges must rewrite stat
utory texts where the plain meaning applied to the facts is absurd); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (assert
ing that it is absurd to apply a statute requiring inspection of ovens for flames when the oven
is electric).
159. Thus, a new textualist could find scenario 5 a de minimis violation and hence exempt
from Rule 12A, Section IX(c)'s automatic penalty, or he could say it is not de minimis, re
serving that kind of exemption to situations where, for example, a player accidently falls off
the bench and onto the floor. In that case, the text would probably not be violated because
the rule only applies when the player fails to "remain in the immediate vicinity of the bench."
What "immediate vicinity" means should depend on where the fight is taking place.
Likewise, a new textualist could find it absurd to apply the rule to scenario 6, where
human life or limb might be lost if the player did not act, or he could refuse to do so, reserv
ing the absurdity exception for those cases where an act in violation of Rule 12A, Section
IX(c) is required by law or other NBA Rules.
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that leaving the bench and going as far as mid-court does create an
enhanced risk of violence on the court: players from the other team
as well as Ewing's team would be more tempted to leave their re
spective benches. I concede that Ewing's case is a hard case. En
forcing the rule against Ewing risks overenforcing the prophylactic
antifighting norm (Silberman's concern), but failing to enforce the
Rule risks underenforcing the norm (my concern). The NBA rules
against fighting, throwing elbows, and unnecessary contact all re
flect a strong policy against on-court violence or even the possibility
of violence.160 The NBA's position is unimpeachable. If there is a
risk of error, I would err on the side of overenforcing this particular
norm if I were advising the Commissioner.161
Probably concurring with my result in scenario 3, Scalia would
in theory object to my consideration of the background of the rule,
its overall purpose, the risks of over- versus underenforcement, and
prior NBA practice. But the jurist doth protest too much. Compar
ing Scalia's theory, as articulated in the Tanner Lectures, with his
practice as demonstrated in his analysis of actual cases, yields this
contrast: the former emphasize the mechanical role of judges as
passive law finders whose neutrality can be assured by proper meth
odology, while the latter reveal an active law maker whose method
ology bursts with discretionary choices informed by normativity.
There is a bit of David Brewer lurking within Nino Scalia,162 and I
originally thought the vehemence of the Tanner Lectures was
Scalia's effort to closet or simply deny his Breweresque tendencies.
On reflection, I think the disconnect between lecture and prac
tice reflects a broader problem facing judges generally and the
Supreme Court in particular. The Court believes its legitimacy rests
160. NBA Rule 12A, Section VII(d)(6) requires a technical foul to be assessed for throw
ing an elbow or "any attempted physical act with no contact involved." NBA OPERATIONS
DEPT., supra note 1, at 42. Rule 12A, Section VIII requires that technical fouls will be auto
matically imposed against a player or coach for fighting, the offender will be ejected from the
game, and the Commissioner may (!) suspend and fine the offender. See id. at 41.
"[U]nnecessary" contact with another player constitutes a "flagrant foul - penalty l," which
under Rule 12B, Section IV(a) entitles the other team to two free throws and possession of
the basketball. Id. at 44. "[U]nnecessary and excessive" contact constitutes a "flagrant foul
- penalty 2," which entitles the other team to two free throws and possession of the basket
ball and requires ejection of the fouling player. Id. Rule 12B also requires that ordinary
fouls must be assessed for all sorts of minor contact, even when unintentional. See id at 4244.

161. Not being the Commissioner, I would defer to his judgment in the actual Ewing case;
I would not interfere
with that judgment.
162. See generally George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99
YALE L.J. 1297 (1990) (theological roots of much of the jurist's philosophy). For a concrete
example, Brewer's "Soliloquy on a Christian Nation" in Holy Trinity Church finds a parallel
in Scalia's "Ode to Blue Collar White Guys" which closes his analytically powerful dissent
against voluntary affirmative action in Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
if Stem believed Ewing's conduct really was outside the rule's purpose,
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upon a public perception or agreement that most of what the Court
does is neutral, technical, even mechanical. So long as the Court
does not disturb current consensus and political equilibrium on im
portant public law issues, it will in fact be seen as neutral. But the
Court is always tempted to be critical or provocative on some issues
(civil rights during the Warren Court, federalism today), and some
of the framers expected the Court to mitigate "partial and unjust
laws," at least to protect common law or constitutional values.
When the Court is being provocative, or politically incorrect, it
needs the cover of neutrality. Because the Court needs to be per
ceived as neutral especially when it is being provocative, it gener
ally needs to avoid the appearance of normativity. That is why one
will almost never hear a Supreme Court justice concede in public
that the Court makes judgment calls, loads the dice in statutory
cases through substantive canons, and has discretion to influence
public policy. Scalia is the most politically incorrect of justices and,
for that reason of interest as well as reasons of principle, the one
most concerned with presenting a neutral image. But as he admit
ted, once and never thereafter, in a judicial opinion, "I am not so
naive (nor do I think our forbears were) as to be unaware that
judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make
it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it - discerning what
the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what
it will tomorrow be."163
The Tanner Lectures can be read as a manifesto for such an "as
though" philosophy of statutory interpretation: the new textualism
is a potentially objective method and vocabulary for solidifying the
Court's reputation as a protector of the rule of law, and the objec
tivity and credibility it creates, or gives the illusion of creating, will
protect the Court when it confronts rather than acquiesces in the
current political equilibrium. That judges say and perhaps believe
this, however, must not deter the unaffiliated academic from insist
ing that what the judges do remains normative rather than mechani
cal, . pragmatic instead of theoretical, and contextual as well as
textual.
CONCLUSION: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT OUGHT TO BE
DOING IN STATUTORY CASES
Textualism is, alas, an unknown ideal. The new textualism is
probably not the salvation of statutory interpretation, which can
best be understood and appreciated as a contextual, pragmatic, and
normative as well as textual, formalist, and positive enterprise. This
163. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) {Scalia, J., concur
ring in the judgment) {offering a reason why Article Ill's grant of "judicial Power" does not
allow the Court leeway to make its decisions prospective only).

May 1998]

Textualism

1557

approach is explicated in an article Phil Frickey and I wrote on
practical reasoning in statutory interpretation and developed fur
ther by each of us in subsequent work.164 Uie practical reasoning
approach that we found in Supreme Court cases and that has
proven robust over time is well-exemplified by the jurisprudence of
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter in particular, but also by
several opinions by Justice Scalia, especially his analytically spectac
ular dissent in the Case of the Used Gun.165 What the best opin
ions, and the most judicious approaches, have in common is hard
hitting and candid analysis of a variety of legal sources for figuring
out what the text means - the language of the statute and its statu
tory context, legislative history (for all but Scalia, of course), statu
tory purpose, canonical policies, the evolution of the statute, and
practical consequences. While a practical reasoning approach is
more contextually inclined and less mechanical than the approach
defended in the Tanner Lectures, it is no less constrained, contrary
to Scalia's argument in those lectures. Referring one final time to
the Case of the Wandering Basketball Player, consider some gen
eral lessons from a practical reasoning approach:
1. The Primacy of Statutory Text. All major theories of statu
tory interpretation consider the statutory text primary. The plain
meaning of a text as applied to a set of facts is the focal point for
attention, whether one is a textualist, intentionalist, or pragmatic
interpreter of statutes. For any of these, there must be a compelling
reason to derogate from the meaning the words would convey to an
ordinary speaker or reader. Thus, I am confident that the large ma
jority of judges would agree with Scalia and me, and disagree with
Linda Silberman and Ronald Dworkin, that Rule 12A, Section
IX(c) was properly applied to Patrick Ewing. Text primacy ought
not mean text fetishism, however, especially when the texts are nor
mative, as they are with statutes. Few interpreters would suspend
164. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. R.Ev. 321 (1990); see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, ch. 2; Araiza,
supra note 151; Scallen, supra note 151; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1073 (1992).
165. I join the chorus of praise for Justice Scalia's classic dissenting opinion in Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Lawrepce M. Solan,
Leaming Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. R.Ev. 235,
270-75. Scalia's persuasive approach to a sentence-enhancement statute was essentially and
correctly followed by the Court in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Other instruc
tive, hard-hitting, and pragmatically as well as linguistically keen opinions include California
Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832, 842
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997)
(Scalia, J.); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996) (Scalia, J.); Blanchard v. Ber
geron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment); Pierce v. Under
wood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (Scalia, J.); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 318-23
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Sometimes, Scalia's exchanges
with other justices produce excellent opinions on either side of a hard issue. See Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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Ewing if he had left the bench to save a life (scenario 6) or taken a
restroom break (scenario 5), not because the text cannot literally
apply to those circumstances, but because the text cannot reason
ably apply, in light of the policy of the Rule (scenario 5) or other
important goals (scenario 6). There is no telling how a new textual
ist would respond to these cases, but my guess is that most would
agree with my resolutions.
2. Constrained Evolution. Tue Tanner Lectures scoff at the idea
that statutory meaning might change over time, common law style
(p. 21-22), but the Case of the Wandering Basketball Player illus
trates how this is so, wholly consistent with a rule of law regime. To
begin with, judges should defer to agency interpretations of statutes
they are charged with enforcing, unless the interpretations are
clearly wrong. Tue same precept surely would apply for the benefit
of the NBA Commissioner. Thus, if I were a judge believing, as I
do, that Ewing should have been suspended for violating the rule, I
should still defer to the Commissioner if he determined that the
rule should not be applied to Ewing's case because the mid-court
wandering posed no danger to the antifighting policy. One can de
bate whether there is any play in this particular rule, but it is clear
that some rules have fuzzy edges that allow administrators to adopt
one interpretation early in the statute's history, and a different one
later on. This is the core case of statutory evolution. Most new
textualists would not allow an agency this degree of latitude, which
Tom Merrill persuasively maintains is a lamentable feature of the
new textualist philosophy.166
Consider another example of statutory evolution: path depen
dence. Assume that a new textualist thinks Rule 12A, Section
IX(c) should require suspension in both scenarios 3 (wandering
mid-court) and 4 (going to the other end of the court). But assume
that the courts authoritatively hold scenario 3 exempt from the sus
pension. Not only would the new textualist be bound as a matter of
stare decisis to scenario 3, but if scenario 4 arose, the honest textu
alist would probably be constrained by precedent to prevent sus
pension there as well - unless she can overrule or persuasively
narrow the earlier precedent. .
Finally, as context changes, the application of Rule 12A, Section
IX(c) can be expected to change, even if the terms of the Rule do
not. If New York City after the Ewing case enacted an ordinance
barring application of this NBA Rule so long as the bench-clearing
athlete is more than fifteen feet from any altercation, the NBA
Commissioner would be justified in cutting back generally on the
application of the plain meaning of Rule 12A, Section IX(c). To
166. See Merrill, supra note 14; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Execu
tive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
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take a more interesting variation, assume that the NBA itself
adopted a new rule prohibiting players from leaving the bench dur
ing a game to use the restroom but without specifying a penalty.
Such a rule change would require me to rethink my earlier refusal
to suspend a player under the circumstances of scenario 5. The rel
evant changed context might also be factual. My disinclination to
apply the rule to scenario 5 would also be turned around if the
NBA reliably found, to my surprise, that players leaving the bench
for the bathroom in tense or fight situations were likely to rile fans,
thereby increasing the possibility of fights among fans or between
fans and players.
Contrary to Scalia, statutory evolution is not the same as willful
judges forcing their personal views onto statutes, any more than the
new textualism is willful judges forcing regulatory statutes into pro
crustean beds. The willful judge will tamper with statutes whatever
the methodology, and dynamic statutory interpretation as a norma
tive proposition means that statutes ought to change in an orderly
common law way, in response to new circumstances and new legal
developments.
3. Judicial Humility and Critical Responsibility. The humble
judge is genuinely interested in the background as well as the text
of the statute she is construing: Why was it adopted? What were
their assumptions? How did its authors use language? With what
terms of art were they familiar? It is relevant to the interpretation
of Rule 12A, Section IX(c) that the NBA adopted the measure af
ter a serious bench-clearing brawl between the Knicks and the Bulls
in 1994, that the brawl was considered embarrassing to the league
and dangerous for the players, and that the mandatory suspension
was deliberately chosen in order to send a strong signal that fighting
would not be tolerated and that the conditions for fighting were to
be avoided. Judicial humility is the main reason that I hesitate to
follow Scalia in advocating a firm "never look at legislative history"
rule. Reading the legislative history puts the judge better in touch
with the values, vocabulary, and policy choices of the authors of the
statute - just as The Federalist does for the framers of the Consti
tution. The humility owed by judges is why Souter's position is the
better one in BFP: Congress was aware of the federalism issues,
resolved the fraudulent conveyance rule to trump state law, and is
owed deference in its resolution.
Because judges are constitutional as well as statutory interpret
ers, they have some critical as well as agency responsibility. Ac
cording to Federalist 78, critique was the reason for judicial
independence. This is a responsibility to be exercised rarely, but
when exercised it should be open and naked, so that if the judge is
wrong she alone will bear responsibility for the error. Consider an
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example: If the NBA Commissioner suspended a player for rescu
ing another player from being choked (scenario 6) and I were a
judge in a position to review the issue as a matter of rule interpreta
tion, I would reverse - notwithstanding the rule's plain meaning,
notwithstanding the player's violating the antifighting goal, and
notwithstanding the humility I am supposed to have and the defer
ence I would ordinarily show to the Commissioner's judgment. I
would reverse because the suspension is at odds with the fundamen
tal disparity between the antifighting policy and the preservation of
human life. I should like to think that Scalia would agree, as a mat
ter of interpretation.

